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ABSTRACT 
In drafting rules regarding public access to electronic court records, a critical 
issue facing the state court system in Maine is how to go about balancing the privacy 
interests of the individual and the state’s interest in providing transparency about the 
court’s operations.  Both interests are important in our democracy, and it is critical 
that the court system take measures to preserve both. 
The purpose of writing this essay is to show that Judge Coffin’s judicial 
philosophy and rights-sensitive balancing process, although the product of a different 
era, is enduring and, if embraced today by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, would 
significantly improve the quality and effectiveness of its decision-making process in 
determining court rules that appropriately balance the rights of the individual against 
the interests of the state, thus engendering increased public trust and confidence in 
its decision. 
Part One, “Framing the Issue,” sets the stage, identifying the key issue to be 
decided as well as the significant interests at stake.  Part Two, “Why Judge Coffin?,” 
addresses the question as to why Judge Coffin, if he were alive today, would be 
concerned about the subject of digital court records access.  Part Three, “Judicial 
Balancing,” provides an overview of Judge Coffin’s rights-sensitive judicial 
balancing approach to decision-making in the “hard cases” involving human rights 
and civil liberties.  Finally, Part Four, “Bringing Judge Coffin into the 
Conversation,” imagines embracing Judge Coffin’s judicial philosophy and using his 
rights-sensitive balancing process as a guide in managing the transition to electronic 
records.  It offers a glimpse into how Judge Coffin, if asked, might go about the task 
of balancing privacy and transparency in the digital era, with a focus on social justice 
and access to justice issues. 
INTRODUCTION  
With its soon-to-be changeover from paper to electronic records, the state court 
system in Maine is about to enter new, uncharted territory.  Unlike other areas of 
government, where digital records have been accessible to the public for quite some 
time, the Maine Judicial Branch (“MJB”) has no experience with managing digital 
court records and dealing with the transparency and privacy challenges of providing 
public access to them.    
The MJB’s transition to the digital world is a major, complex undertaking.  In 
her 2019 annual State of the Judiciary Address to the Legislature, Chief Justice 
Saufley described the e-filing/digital case management system initiative as “one of 
the most complex projects [she has] ever been involved with in Government.”1 
As noted by Laura O’Hanlon, Esq., who worked with the Chief Justice in various 
administrative roles in the MJB for many years, “[c]oming from a seasoned public 
servant and three-term leader of a chronically underfunded branch of state 
government, this is a profound statement.”2   
                                                                                                     
1  Hon. Leigh I. Saufley, The State of the Judiciary: A Report to the Joint Convention of the First Reg. 
Session of the 129th Maine Leg., SOJ 2019, (Feb. 26, 2019) 
https://courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/supreme/speeches/state-of-judiciary-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T35K-5TRV]. 
2  Laura M. O’Hanlon, E-Filing: It’s a Big Deal, 34 ME. B.J. 127, 127 (2019). 
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It is critical that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) get it right in 
orchestrating the conversion to electronic records because the stakes are exceedingly 
high for individuals, society, and the Judicial Branch as an institution.  If not 
managed correctly, the SJC risks undermining fundamental democratic values, 
including liberty and equality, and trampling on the rights of individuals, which 
disproportionately affects the rights of the most vulnerable people in our society, 
including the unrepresented, minorities, the poor, children, victims of abuse and 
assault, and geographically disadvantaged.   
While there are some who might argue that the MJB has been managing court 
records just fine in the paper world and that any issues regarding access to justice 
and social justice, including public access to court records, were resolved long ago 
and are thus well settled, others would argue, as I do, that moving to the digital world 
creates a whole new set of concerns. 
That digital is different, requiring careful re-evaluation of these “settled” issues, 
is one of the biggest takeaways from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Carpenter v. United States.3  There, noting the deeply revealing nature of cell-site 
location information (“CSLI”) technology, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive 
reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to the government’s search 
of CSLI.  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts observed:    
The Government’s position fails to contend with the seismic shifts in digital 
technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also 
everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years. Sprint Corporation 
and its competitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor who 
keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly 
infallible. There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal 
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location 
information casually collected by wireless carriers today.4 
Carpenter also reminds us that “[a] person does not surrender all Fourth 
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, ‘what 
[one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.’”5  Similarly, those who enter public courthouses, whether 
physically in person or virtually via an online portal, should not have to surrender 
their privacy in exchange for the right to seek justice from the only institution 
constitutionally vested with the ability to provide it. 
A consistent theme in Judge Coffin’s life’s work and writings is that the law 
must continue to evolve to meet the demands of society.  Writing about the “hard 
cases” that confront appellate judges, which present conflicts between the rights of 
individuals and the interests of the state, Judge Coffin observed:  
                                                                                                     
3  See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
4  Id. at 2219. See also Stuart A. Thompson and Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, 
Zero Privacy, NY TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html 
[https://perma.cc/2C8A-RNGD]. 
5  Id. at 2217 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
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[T]here is little likelihood that constitutional analysis in this area will be frozen in 
crystalline form. Variations of the human predicament, as the individual and society 
interact, are infinite. New conditions, technology, and laws never cease to make 
their appearance. State courts are free to probe the meaning and reach of state 
constitutions. And the Supreme Court itself is subject to change over time.6 
Predicting that “access to government, including the courts, fairness in 
institutional proceedings, equality of consideration and treatment, and residual 
privacy in a crowded world will be increasingly cherished individual objectives,” 
Judge Coffin argued that “[t]his state of affairs . . . should move us to . . . sensitize 
our process of balancing individual rights and society’s interests, and to examine 
ways of preserving our essential social fabric from disintegration by the alienation 
of large sectors of society.”7 
This age-old tenet – that the law must continue to adapt to changes in society – 
was evoked more than a century ago by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their 
famous Harvard Law Review essay,8 in which they formulated a right to privacy in 
the common law.  The authors’ call for the law to adapt is as relevant now, if not 
more so, as it was when the essay was written in 1890:   
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle 
as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to 
define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and 
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its 
eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.9  
With the MJB’s soon-to-be digital transformation, the same principle applies 
today.  Given the fast pace of technological innovation and the increasing centrality 
of personal information in the global economy, coupled with the potential societal 
costs and the types of individual harms that can come from misuse of such 
information, it is imperative that the SJC proceed cautiously and with sensitivity in 
balancing the rights of the individual against societal interests.  In looking afresh at 
where to draw the line between privacy and transparency in the digital environment, 
the SJC must be careful to maintain prevailing social norms if it hopes to preserve 
the liberty, equality, and other moral values cherished in our democracy.  “Our 
privacy is not simply a privilege derived from our freedom. Far more important, it is 
an integral element of our liberty, ‘the most comprehensive of rights,’ as Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis recognized, ‘and the right most valued by civilized man.’” 10  
The purpose of writing this essay is to show that Judge Coffin’s judicial 
philosophy, although the product of a different time period, is enduring and has much 
to contribute to today’s conversation among the MJB, members of the Bar and the 
public regarding the MJB’s transition from paper to electronic records.  His “rights-
                                                                                                     
6  Hon. Frank M. Coffin, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 276 (W. W. Norton & Co. 
Inc., 1994) [hereinafter ON APPEAL]. 
7  Id. at 280. 
8  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
9  Id. 
10  Orlando Patterson, What is Freedom Without Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 1998), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/15/opinion/what-is-freedom-without-privacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/EYB5-NQ3B]. 
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sensitive judicial balancing” framework can be effective in assisting the SJC in 
determining court rules that appropriately balance the rights of the individual against 
the interests of the state.   
Part One, “Framing the Issue,” sets the stage, identifying the key issue to be 
decided as well as the significant interests at stake.  It also describes the MJB’s 
efforts to study and understand some of the important policy considerations 
surrounding implementation of the new electronic system.  Part Two, “Why Judge 
Coffin?,” addresses the question as to why Judge Coffin, if he were alive today, 
would be concerned about the subject of digital court records access.  For readers 
who are not familiar with Judge Coffin, it provides a brief summary of his lifelong 
dedication to advancing the goal of ensuring that all persons, no matter their 
financial, social or other circumstances, have meaningful access to justice.   
Part Three, “Judicial Balancing,” provides an overview of Judge Coffin’s rights-
sensitive judicial balancing approach to decision-making in the “hard cases” 
involving human rights and civil liberties.  It describes the essential qualities of 
judicial decision-making that “must permeate the [balancing] process” if it is to be 
fully realized.  It also examines each of the key elements of his approach for 
achieving a “fully realized balancing process.”  Finally, Part Four, “Bringing Judge 
Coffin into the Conversation,” proposes that the SJC embrace Judge Coffin’s judicial 
philosophy and use his rights-sensitive balancing process as a guide in managing the 
transition to electronic records.  It offers a glimpse into how Judge Coffin, if asked, 
might go about the task of balancing privacy and transparency, with a focus on the 
social justice and access to justice interests implicated by the transition.  It also 
imagines what questions he might ask and what insights and recommendations he 
might share.  
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
For the SJC, balancing transparency and privacy interests in the context of 
online public access to court records is a novel undertaking.  This is one of those 
“hard cases” described by Judge Coffin in which the outcome is “not clearly 
determined by preexisting principles, rules, or precedents.”11     
There is no case precedent that directly addresses the issue.  Maine courts have 
not ruled on online public access.12  Other jurisdictions which have considered digital 
court records access issues have reached conflicting conclusions, and the United 
States Supreme Court has not weighed in.13  Although the United States Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized a qualified First Amendment right of the public to 
                                                                                                     
11  ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 275. 
12  See, e.g., Conservatorship of Emma, 2017 ME 1, ¶ 10, 153 A.3d 102 (declining to answer question 
concerning the availability of court records and docket information in electronic format reported by 
Probate Court).  
13  See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of Practical 
Obscurity, U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1385 (2017); Courthouse News Service v. Yamasaki, 2018 WL 
3862905 (USDC C.D. CA 2018) (holding that the Orange County Superior Court’s civil complaint 
privacy review policies and practices do not violate the First Amendment right of access, applying the 
time, place and manner regulation test from Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)) 
(presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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attend certain criminal proceedings,14  it has not yet addressed the issue of whether 
there is a First Amendment right of public access to civil proceedings or court 
records.15   
There is no general constitutional right of access to information in the 
government's possession.16  Even if information-gathering is found to be entitled to 
some measure of constitutional protection in the context of civil proceedings, it is 
well recognized that “the freedom to obtain information that the government has a 
legitimate interest in not disclosing is far narrower than the freedom to disseminate 
information.”17  Calling for restraint in evaluating the existence of a right of access 
in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan observed: 
Because ‘the stretch of this protection is theoretically endless,’ it must be invoked 
with discrimination and temperance.  For so far as the participating citizen’s need 
for information is concerned, ‘[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not 
be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.’  An assertion 
of the prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed by considering 
the information sought and the opposing interests invaded.18 
An in-depth exploration of the legal authorities regarding the constitutional and 
common law rights of access is beyond the scope of this article.  Suffice it to say that 
the full scope of the constitutional right of access is not settled in the law, nor is the 
appropriate legal framework for analyzing the issue.  
Although arising in the analog era, the foremost United States Supreme Court 
decision addressing public access to federal court records is Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc. 19  There the Supreme Court noted that “the courts of this 
country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 
including judicial records and documents.”20  The Court explained that the right to 
access public records is justified by “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on 
the workings of public agencies, and in a newspaper publisher’s intention to publish 
information concerning the operation of government.” 21  
As the Nixon Court noted, however, the common law right of access to court 
                                                                                                     
14  See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (finding First Amendment 
right of public access to criminal trials and noting that “[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of 
speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so 
as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees”).  
15  A comprehensive Westlaw search conducted by the author uncovered no United States Supreme 
Court case directly addressing the issue of whether there is a constitutional right of access to civil 
proceedings or court records.  See David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 836, 840 (2017) (reaching the same conclusion).   
16  See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (no First Amendment right to access 
discovery materials); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the 
First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information 
or sources of information within the government's control.”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) 
(“The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”). 
17  Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
18  Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 588. 
19  Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978).   
20  Id. at 597. 
21  Id. at 598 (citations omitted). 
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records is not absolute. 22  Every court has supervisory power over its own records 
and files.23  Access to records has been denied where court files might have become 
a vehicle for improper purposes.24  Examples include instances where records could 
have been used to promote scandal by revealing embarrassing personal information, 
to serve as “reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption,” or to harm a 
litigant’s business. 25  The decision to permit access “is one best left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts 
and circumstances of the particular case.”26 
The federal court’s experience with its Public Access to Court Electronic Record 
system (“PACER”) is of limited relevance.  Maine’s new electronic court system will 
be different from (and in some instances an improvement over) PACER.  In addition, 
federal and state court case types, case volumes, and resource allocations are not 
comparable.  Unlike the federal courts, Maine state courts handle a large number of 
cases affecting very sensitive personal matters, including those involving divorce, 
parental rights, parentage, juveniles, veterans, and sexual abuse.  In addition to 
processing a greater volume of cases, the state courts service unrepresented litigants 
at rates far above those in the federal courts.27 
Even when the common law right of access attaches, courts are under no 
obligation to publish court records on the internet.  In Maine, the SJC has the 
exclusive authority to exercise judicial power. 28  Its decision whether to permit 
access to court records is at the core of judicial power.  Its decision about how to 
permit access is also within its discretion.   
Illustrative of this important separation of powers principle is the direct letter of 
address dated April 25, 1986 submitted by a unanimous Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court to the Governor and legislative leadership.29  Addressing a strikingly 
analogous context, the SJC declared that it was “compelled by the Maine 
Constitution not to follow the expressed mandate of the Legislature,” stating, in part:  
With the enactment of P.L. 1985, ch. 515, which becomes effective July 16, 1986, 
the Legislature has directed this Court to promulgate rules governing photographic 
and electronic media coverage of proceedings in the trial courts of this State.  Upon 
due consideration, this Court concludes that the governance of media access to 
courtrooms is within the judicial power committed to this Court by the Maine 
Constitution.  Me. Const. art. VI, §1.  Chapter 515 constitutes an exercise of judicial 
power by the Legislature in violation of the provisions of the Constitution allocating 
                                                                                                     
22  Id. at 598; see also United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Nixon for 
the proposition that right of access is not absolute); United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d, 1044, 1047-51 
(2d Cir. 1995) (applying a balancing test to determine if public access is proper).   
23  Id. at 598. 
24  Id.  
25  Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. 
26  Id. at 599.   
27  Lauren Sudeall Lucas & Darcy Meals, Every Year, Millions Try to Navigate US Courts Without 
a Lawyer, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 21, 2017), http://theconversation.com/every-year-millions-try-to-
navigate-us-courts-without-a-lawyer-84159 [https://perma.cc/EVR2-NUSC] (“In some states, as many 
as eighty to ninety percent of litigants are unrepresented, even though their opponent has a lawyer.”).  
28  Me. Const. art. VI, § 1. 
29  Direct Letter of Address to Joseph E. Brennan, Charles P. Pray and John L. Martin dated April 25, 
1986, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d CXXVI. 
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the powers of government among three distinct departments and forbidding any 
person belonging to one department from exercising any power properly belonging 
to another department.  Me. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2.  Accordingly, we respectfully 
decline to promulgate rules as contemplated by the legislative act.30 
Early in 2019, in providing testimony to the Joint Standing Committee on State 
and Local Government, the SJC had occasion to reiterate this important separation 
of powers principle, advising the legislative branch that the SJC has exclusive 
authority for managing the retention and deletion of court records.31  Recognizing 
the importance of information management, both access to records and protection of 
documents and data, the SJC has regularly engaged subject matter experts to assist 
in policy formation. In recent history, the SJC launched two major stakeholder efforts 
relating to electronic and digital court records access. 
In mid-2004, the MJB created the Task Force on Electronic Court Records 
Access (“TECRA”) to study and make recommendations regarding public access to 
court records.  In its charter for TECRA, the SJC stated: 
The Task Force shall explore the policy issues raised in this charter . . . and shall 
make recommendations to the Supreme Judicial Court for the promulgation of rules, 
orders, statutes, or policies that will have the effect of allowing the broadest of 
public access to court records that can be achieved while balancing the competing 
goals of public safety, personal privacy, and the integrity of the court system.32  
By way of background, the SJC observed at that time: 
Maine’s state court records are available for in-person review at the courthouse 
where the particular file has been created, subject to various statutes and rules 
governing confidentiality.  Some of the information contained in court files is stored 
in an electronic format through the Maine Judicial Information System (MEJIS).  In 
the future, additional documents and additional case types will be recorded in the 
MEJIS system. Through advances in technology, wider public access to electronic 
records may soon be achievable through several routes.  As a result, the Judicial 
Branch is at a point where public policy matters need to be addressed and rules 
implemented to establish a comprehensive approach to providing access to 
electronic court records. 
 
                                                                                                     
30  Id.    
31  The Maine Judicial Branch submitted testimony related to L.D. 521, An Act to Amend the Archives 
and Records Management Law, which stated: 
[t]he Judicial Branch is a separate branch of government under the Maine Constitution. See Article VI, 
Me. Const.  In addition, title four of the Maine Revised Statutes bestows broad authority on the branch 
to manage the statewide court system. “The Supreme Judicial Court has general administrative and 
supervisory authority over the judicial branch and shall make and promulgate rules, regulations and 
orders governing the administration of the judicial branch...”. 4 MRS § l. Title four specifically grants to 
the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) the management and control of its records.” 
An Act to Amend the Archives and Records Management Law: Hearing on L.D. 521 Before the 
Judiciary Comm., 129th Me. Leg., Reg. Sess. (2019) (statement of the Administrative Office of the 
Courts). 
32  TASK FORCE ON ELECTRONIC COURT RECORD ACCESS, FINAL REPORT TO THE JUSTICES OF THE 
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT app. A 2 (2005), 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/tap/VI-A-TECRA-Report.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/62FD-QG26] [hereinafter TECRA REPORT]. 
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Among the issues to be addressed by the Judicial Branch is the need to carefully 
consider how it will handle the release or withholding of non-conviction criminal 
data, to which the public is allowed only limited access when such data is held by 
other branches of government, pursuant to the Freedom of Access Act.  In addition, 
the court system must balance the public’s interest in accessing court records against 
the privacy concerns of litigants, witnesses, and others, particularly when an 
individual is at risk of violence from another person.33 
In brief, TECRA articulated its mission in this way, “[t]o establish consistent 
policies for access to court record data and information, in electronic and hardcopy 
formats, which promotes open accessibility while still protecting the safety and 
privacy interests of members of the public.”34  In its report to the SJC, TECRA 
recommended the adoption of a two-tier approach to private information: (1) 
confidential information would not be available in any form, and (2) information that 
is sensitive or that could expose a person to needless harm would be available in 
person by request at a courthouse but not on a court website.35   
More than a decade later, and without ever commenting publicly about 
TECRA’s recommendations during that entire intervening period, the SJC created a 
Transparency and Privacy Task Force (“TAP”).  TAP’s membership, which included 
multiple stakeholders (including the author), was hand-picked by the Chief Justice 
to study the issues and offer policy recommendations about digital court records 
access.36  
In its charter for TAP, the SJC stated: 
The goals of the Task Force are to review all case types and recommend a 
comprehensive set of rules to address all court records, with accompanying 
guidelines and suggestions for any necessary statutory changes including but not 
limited to: 
 Court Files generally, by case type; 
 Document content, including trial and motion exhibits; 
 Specific types of information within court files – for example, social 
security numbers, private financial, medical, or psychiatric information; 
 Digital images, videos, or other evidence in court records that may have 
specific privacy related characteristics; and 
 Accessibility of trial lists, scheduling lists, court schedules.37  
By way of background, the SJC observed: 
For decades and even centuries, court files have existed in paper format. The 
presumption, in the absence of specific statutory language or court order, has been 
that the documents contained in case files are open to anyone willing to come to the 
courthouse to examine the files. 
                                                                                                     
33  Id.  
34  Id. at app. B 8. 
35  See id. at 8.     
36  See Judicial Branch Transparency and Privacy Task Force, MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/tap/index.html [https://perma.cc/6DPZ-NH9F] 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019) [hereinafter TAP WEBSITE]. 
37  MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH TASK FORCE ON TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY IN COURT RECORDS 1-2 
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/tap/charter-tap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JQ8P-HN3J]. 
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Today, transparency in judicial action remains a critical component of public trust 
and confidence, and yet that transparency must be balanced against the recognition 
that public access to certain personal information contained in court files is not 
appropriate and that specific types of personal information, if released publicly, can 
lead to identity theft or other harms. 
 
With the advent of emerging technologies, the Judicial Branch is challenged to 
address the increasingly complex questions related to public access to court records.  
The easier, remote accessibility that will accompany the replacement of paper court 
files with digital court records, as well as the relatively recent practices of the digital 
sharing or sale of private information or illegal images require a thoughtful and clear 
system of access rules. 
 
As the Judicial Branch prepares to transition from paper to digital files, it would 
benefit the public, the litigants, and individuals with unique issues of privacy to 
establish clear guidelines and rules related to the access to the wide variety of court 
records.38  
In September 2017, TAP issued a report39 outlining a cautious-incremental 
approach: advising the Judicial Branch to start slowly – offering remote access for 
parties and their lawyers only, and providing public access at terminals located in 
every courthouse statewide, while the court system evaluated the functionality of its 
new system and received actual user-experience and to adjust the extent of and 
mechanisms for access regularly.  At the same time, TAP recommended measures to 
ensure privacy concerns are not trampled during the transition to electronic court 
records. 40   
 In making its recommendations, TAP explained that: 
[Its] discussions and analyses were grounded in two key, and sometimes competing, 
principles related to the public’s trust and confidence in the court system as an 
institution.  First, government operations must be open and transparent so that 
citizens can understand how the courts operate and evaluate the operations of 
government . . . . Second, individuals have a valid interest in and expectation that 
their own private information will be handled appropriately. The Court’s 
transparency and privacy policy must not discourage citizens from seeking justice 
through the courts for fear that their personal information will be unduly distributed.  
Additionally, the decision to release certain information must be made with 
awareness that the misuse of personal information may present personal safety, 
financial, and data security risks for the persons involved.  The recommendations of 
                                                                                                     
38  Id. at 1. 
39  REPORT OF THE MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH TASK FORCE ON TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY IN COURT 
RECORDS (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/tap/mjb-task-force-
tap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E664-H5R9] [hereinafter TAP REPORT]. The TAP Report included 
eighteen recommendations, and proposed a summary policy statement, an administrative order 
governing case record access, and two rules of procedure (one civil and one criminal).  TAP’s Report, as 
well as other information about the TAP Task Force, including the membership roster, meeting minutes, 
a dissenting opinion, and other related materials can be viewed on the TAP webpage, available at: 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/tap/ [https://perma.cc/NGH7-VTC4]. 
40  MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH TASK FORCE ON TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY  
IN COURT RECORDS, supra note 37, at 16-18.   
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TAP reflect an effort to balance these two important principles. 41 
If accepted, TAP’s recommendations would have marked a substantial 
expansion in access to court records in the State of Maine.  Under the current paper 
system, almost no information is available online.42  Instead, parties and the public 
alike must appear in person at the relevant clerk’s office to uncover even the most 
rudimentary case information.  Nor are they able to access information from the 
nearest court, but instead must identify the clerk’s office where the case resides and 
travel there—however far.  Or, they must submit a request in person or by mail and 
pay a fee for the MJB to process a records request and wait to receive the results by 
mail.43 
Following release of the TAP report, the MJB solicited written comments about 
the limits on and degree of accessibility of digital court records.44  Subsequently, the 
SJC scheduled a public hearing for June 2018 “to receive oral comments regarding 
access to electronic court records as electronic filing is implemented.”45  At the outset 
of the public hearing, and much to the surprise of those gathered in the packed 
courtroom, the Chief Justice announced that the SJC had “determined that digital 
case records that are public records will, in most instances, be available on the 
internet.”46 The stated purpose for making this pronouncement was to cut-off further 
discussion about TAP’s recommendations and to narrow the focus of the hearing to 
the issue as to what constitutes a public record.  The Chief Justice stated:  
with [the] advances [in technology] we have concluded that it is not likely the court 
system will maintain a non-internet-based public access to digital public court 
records.  Thus, the critical issues for the court will narrow to identifying which 
records are public and whether and to what extent there will be any costs for various 
types of searches for public digital records but that access for the public will be 
through the internet.  And I say this to everyone so that you can help focus your 
comments and help us think about public records and what records are not public.47 
By making this unexpected announcement and limiting public commentary, the 
SJC rejected one of the core recommendations of TAP and TECRA, thereby limiting 
its options for protecting the rights of individuals, without any explanation as to its 
reasoning.  It also showed that the SJC had decided to change the way in which to 
frame the digital court records access issue, perhaps reflecting its evolving views on 
                                                                                                     
41  Id. at 1. 
42  In October 2018, the Maine state court system’s traffic ticket system went online, 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/traffic/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/B4PP-K7EY].  
Maine’s county probate courts have been putting their records online since 2014, 
https://www.maineprobate.net/welcome/ [https://perma.cc/36SV-MFHR]; see also Conservatorship of 
Emma, 2017 ME 1, ¶ 9, 153 A.3d 102.  
43  Revised Court Fee and Document Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as 
amended by A. 10-19) (effective Oct. 2, 2019); see also Public Information and Confidentiality, Me. 
Admin. Order JB-05-20 (as amended by A. 5-19) (effective May 1, 2019); see generally Request for 
Records Search, ME. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/fees_forms/forms/pdf_forms/misc/records.shtml [https://perma.cc/SEL7-
VLW5] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
44  2017 written comments can be found on the TAP WEBSITE, supra note 36. 
45  TAP WEBSITE, supra note 36, at l. 
46  June 2018 public hearing audio recordings can be found on the TAP WEBSITE, supra note 36.    
47  Id. Part I at 4:20 (emphasis added). 
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the subject or bowing to political considerations.  Unfortunately we do not know, 
since the SJC did not explain its reasoning for the shift, nor has it explained the 
rationale for the quixotic decisions it has made since the hearing, including the 
legislative course it has been charting.48   
In February 2019, the SJC released draft digital court records access and related 
procedural rules.49  In brief, those draft rules reflected the SJC’s decision that in case 
types comprising approximately 85% of the annual caseload, case records would be 
available to the public on the internet.50  With a few exceptions, all criminal, civil, 
and traffic infractions records would be publicly available online.  For example, 
certain sensitive case types such as adoption, child protection, juvenile, and mental 
health civil commitment records would not be publicly available.  Family matters, 
including divorces, would be treated differently; the nature of the proceedings and 
summaries of judicial actions in the cases would be publicly available, but the filings 
between and among the parties would not be public.  Specific categories of personal 
information (such as social security numbers, bank account numbers, and medical 
records) also would not be available to the public. 
While moving from a paper-based court system to an electronic one will 
revolutionize the way courts provide service to the public, certain segments of the 
population will not realize the benefits of a new system without special attention to 
their needs. 51  For example, approximately seventy-five percent of the litigants in 
family related cases are unrepresented; and approximately eighty-six percent of cases 
coming before family law magistrates (in 2012) had one or fewer attorneys.52  
Although they are not documented, the numbers are similar in other district court 
case types.  
While interactive court forms may assist unrepresented litigants to create the 
proper documents to file, and online information will allow users to follow their 
cases from any device from anywhere, for many other people in Maine there will be 
significant new challenges to overcome with the electronic court system.  For 
example, according to a 2009 national assessment of adult literacy, twenty-two 
percent of adults in Maine function at the lowest level of literacy and forty-three 
                                                                                                     
48  In January 2019, the SJC released for public comment proposed legislation seeking to codify digital 
court records access rules.  The bill ultimately was not presented to the Legislature.  Then, in May 2019, 
the Legislature reviewed L.D. 1759: An Act Regarding the Electronic Data and Court Records Filed in 
the Electronic Case Management System of the Supreme Judicial Court (submitted as a Department Bill 
and presented and co-sponsored by the Chairs and other members of the Judiciary Committee) directing 
the SJC to create specific court record access rules and procedures.  After a work session and public 
hearing, the Committee carried the bill over to the second regular session where it was voted Ought Not 
to Pass.  L.D. 1759 (129th Legis. 2019).  
49  Notice of Opportunity to Comment, ME. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/access_to_records_2019-02-
27/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/P755-EWMH] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019). All public comments can be 
viewed on the Center for Transparency and Privacy (CTAP) Maine website: http://ctap.me/current-
focus/ [https://perma.cc/4TKB-GJU7] [hereinafter CTAP Website]. 
50  See Saufley, supra note 1.  
51  See CTAP WEBSITE, supra note 49 (Legal Service Provider Comments).   
52  FAMILY DIVISION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT TO THE JUSTICES OF THE MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT 20 (2013), https://www.courts.maine.gov/reports_pubs/reports/pdf/FDTF_2014_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5PFW-XVXL]. 
2020] DIGITAL COURT RECORDS ACCESS 99 
percent of those adults live in poverty.53 About twelve percent of Maine households 
do not have computers, and twenty percent do not have a broadband internet 
subscription.54  About twelve percent of Maine’s population lives in poverty, and 
more than six percent of Maine families do not speak English at home.55  And there 
are some who live in places with little to no broadband access,56 unreliable 
transportation, or communities without libraries.  Digital court records access will 
also create new challenges and concerns for people who are seeking to hide from 
former abusive partners or other dangerous individuals, to avoid identity theft, or to 
keep their children safe.   
A new set of proposed Electronic Court Records Access Rules released in fall 
2019,57 would impose on filers certain new and extensive obligations.  For example, 
Rule 12 of the November 2019 proposed Maine Rules for Electronic Court Records 
Access (“ECRA”) states, “[i]t is the responsibility of the filing party to ensure that 
sealed or impounded court records, or nonpublic cases, documents, and information 
are redacted and/or submitted to the court in accordance with this rule.”58  Subpart 
(A) of Rule 12 goes on to instruct filers in this way, “[f]or all cases designated as 
sealed, impounded, or nonpublic, every filing must be clearly and conspicuously 
marked, ‘NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE . . .’” and subpart (D) warns  
[i]f a filed document does not comply with the requirements of these rules, a court 
shall, upon motion or its own initiative, order the filed document returned, and that 
document shall be deemed not to have been filed.  A court may impose sanctions on 
any party or person filing a noncompliant document.59  
Placing responsibility on filers to determine what cases and documents are 
nonpublic or should be sealed or impounded seems unworkable, especially given the 
large percentage of litigants who do not have lawyers.  Requiring unrepresented 
plaintiff-litigants to conduct the proper assessment of – and how to protect – their 
privacy rights is not realistic.60  In any event, the privacy interests of defendants as 
                                                                                                     
53  Editorial, The Benefits of Literacy, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 16, 2009), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2009/06/16/opinion/the-benefits-of-literacy/ [https://perma.cc/9N4T-
2Z3E].  
54  United States Census Bureau, Maine QuickFacts, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ME/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/4WPR-SBTY] (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
55  Id. 
56  With respect to broadband coverage, ten percent of Maine’s population is “underserved.” Internet 
Access in Maine, BROADBANDNOW, https://broadbandnow.com/Maine [https://perma.cc/Z5PX-NZ5V] 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
57  As this article goes to publication, members of the MJB are scheduled to present information about 
the new e-filing/digital case management system at the Maine State Bar Association’s winter meeting in 
January 2020, the SJC continues to receive comments on the proposed Electronic Court Records Access 
rules, and it is expected that information sessions for the public will be scheduled in early 2020. 
58  State of Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Draft Maine Digital Court Access Rules, Rule 12, 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/access_to_records_2019-02-
27/draft_dcrar_2019-02-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8QB-PVR3] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
59  Id. at Rule 12(d) 
60  Thomas M. Clarke, et. al, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, BEST PRACTICES FOR COURT PRIVACY 
POLICY FORMULATION 3 (July 2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/About%20Us/Committees/JTC/Best%20Practices%20Privacy
%20-%20July%202017.ashx [https://perma.cc/Q8YF-YMJQ] (“As the proportion of court cases 
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well as nonparties are at risk too and should not be entrusted solely to the care of 
plaintiffs.  Given the volume of federal and state laws enacted and amended each 
year,61 complying with Rule 12 will be a major new undertaking for Maine lawyers 
and an impossible hurdle for unrepresented litigants. 
Informing many of TAP’s recommendations was an awareness that digital 
information is qualitatively different from paper-based records.  For hundreds of 
years, a court record was a written or printed document, which existed in one place 
at one time.  The age of mechanical reproduction allowed for court records to be 
copied and disseminated, but they were still tangible objects that existed in a physical 
location.  In contrast, an electronic court record is simply information—a collection 
of fleeting ones and zeros—which is stored in virtual space on computers that could 
be located anywhere in the world and can be transmitted around the world in an 
instant with the click of a mouse.  
The implications of digital data are enormous, and they are both positive and 
negative. Concerning court records, this change means that more people can more 
easily obtain information about what is happening in our court system, whether it 
involves their own personal legal cases or matters of public concern.  But, it also 
means that the sensitive information contained in court records is more easily located 
and widely disseminated, imperiling personal privacy.  Such information, in digital 
form, also is exceedingly durable and permanent.  It is never in danger of being 
forgotten with the passage of time.  As Anita Allen writes, “[e]lectronic accessibility 
renders past and current events equally knowable. The very ideas of ‘past’ and 
‘present’ in relation to personal information are in danger of evaporating.”62  And as 
observed by Caren Myers Morrison, “[i]n cyberspace, there is no such thing as 
yellowing paper, fading ink, or documents too hard to reach because they are 
squashed at the back of a rusty filing cabinet. In this world, summoning up the past 
is as effortless as clicking a mouse.”63 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the difference between searching 
physical documents and electronic data in its landmark decision of Riley v. 
California, requiring police officers to obtain a search warrant before examining the 
contents of a cellphone seized incident to an arrest.64  In Riley, the government argued 
that a search of electronic data contained in a cellphone is “materially 
indistinguishable” from searches of physical items, such as address books, wallets, 
and notes, which are permitted without a warrant. 65  Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected that argument, noting that comparing a search of all 
data contained in a cellphone to a search of physical documents contained in a 
                                                                                                     
involving self-represented litigants has grown over the last decade or so, the probability that filers will 
fully comply [with the redaction rules] has correspondingly dropped.”) (last visited Dec. 30, 2019). 
61  For example, building upon research undertaken by the Legislature’s Office of Policy and Legal 
Analysis, TAP cataloged hundreds of state laws related to confidential information.  Additionally, TAP 
created an overview of the categories of state laws regarded as confidential by the Maine Legislature. 
See TAP Website, supra note 36.  In light of TAP’s deadlines, a review of federal law was not possible.  
62  Anita L. Allen, Symposium, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 47, 62 (2008). 
63  Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New 
Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 964 (2009). 
64  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014). 
65  Id. at 393. 
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person’s pocket was “like saying that a ride on horseback is materially 
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”66  “Both are ways of getting from point 
A to point B,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “but little else justifies lumping them 
together.”67 
In the digital world, exponentially more information can be stored in a smaller 
space, and it can be analyzed to reveal patterns with greater speed and accuracy.68  
Searching through hard copy documents, whether found in a criminal suspect’s 
pocket or in a file folder, takes time and effort.  And, there is a tangible limit on how 
much information can be contained in a paper file folder or in a person’s pocket.  
These spatial constraints, among other physical world constraints, provide a measure 
of protection that members of the public have come to rely upon, and which the 
courts ought to recognize as reasonable.69  As explained by Daniel Solove, a leading 
privacy law scholar, 
Privacy involves an expectation of a certain degree of accessibility of information . 
. . . [P]rivacy entails control over and limitations on certain uses of information, 
even if the information is not concealed.  Privacy can be violated by altering levels 
of accessibility, by taking obscure facts and making them widely accessible.  Our 
expectation of limits on the degree of accessibility emerges from the fact that 
information in public records has remained relatively inaccessible for much of our 
history.70 
Putting sensitive information online and making it publicly accessible poses new 
privacy threats to individuals.  For example, in EW v. New York Blood Ctr., that court 
allowed the plaintiff who alleged that he had contracted hepatitis B from a blood 
                                                                                                     
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  Id.; see also Phoebe Wong, Everything a Data Scientist Should Know About Data Management, 
TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/everything-a-data-scientist-should-know-about-data-management-
6877788c6a42 [https://perma.cc/JJ47-G9T6]. 
69  Both TECRA and TAP endorsed the concept of “practical obscurity,” which applies to records held 
in paper form in a particular physical location. TAP REPORT, supra note 39, at 3; TECRA REPORT, 
supra note 32, at 8.  Paper records are protected, though not as absolutely protected as sealed records.  
As TECRA observed, “[a]lthough the data is theoretically available, it is very unlikely that it would ever 
be viewed by anyone or widely disseminated due to the fact that it is too inconvenient to uncover.” 
TECRA REPORT, supra note 32, at 8.  “By contrast, electronic data or documents are accessible to an 
anonymous inquisitor at the click of a button.” Id. at 9.  Similarly, TAP articulated this important 
principle as well, noting that “[w]hen individuals go to the courthouse to access files, they must do so in 
an open manner,” while “individuals who access information online can anonymously probe” legal 
material whether their purpose is benign or malignant. TAP REPORT, supra note 39, at 10.  As a member 
of TAP, this author submitted comments explaining that personal records were “once protected by the 
practical difficulties of gaining access to the records,” but the transition to electronic records removes 
that layer of protection. TAP REPORT, Attachment 5a, Concurring Report of Peter J. Guffin, Esq., at 1.  
TAP observed that this “practical obscurity” is a way of providing meaningful protection for private 
material that is not legally confidential, as courts manage the transition from primarily paper to 
primarily electronic records. Id. at 3-4.  This, it was hoped, would minimize the dangers of unforeseen 
complications, such as the likelihood that domestic violence victims will be less likely to avail 
themselves of the court’s protection if their names and case files are available to casual online browsers, 
or that financial crimes or identity theft will become even more common. Id.   
70  Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. 
L. REV. 1137, 1178 (2001). 
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transfusion to proceed under a pseudonym, comparing “access to court files by those 
surfing the Internet” to the “modern enterprise and invention” identified by Warren 
and Brandeis as capable of inflicting greater mental harm through the invasion of 
privacy “than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”71  
Similarly, in Doe v. Cabrera, that court permitted a plaintiff to use a pseudonym 
in her civil action concerning sexual assault, over the defendant’s complaint that the 
plaintiff chose to bring the suit knowing that her identity would be revealed in the 
process.72  That court rejected that objection, noting that, in the age of electronic 
filing, simply being identified in connection with a lawsuit could subject the plaintiff 
to “unnecessary interrogation, criticism, or psychological trauma.”73  While the court 
noted its appreciation for “the public benefits of the Internet,” it expressed concern 
over the internet’s “unfortunate drawback of providing an avenue for harassing 
people as well.”74  
In framing the issue to be decided by the SJC, Laura O’Hanlon summed it up 
well when she stated: 
One of the most important questions that the SJC must answer before e-filing rolls 
out in the first judicial region is how to balance the public’s right to governmental 
transparency with the personal privacy concerns raised by the use of technology.  In 
more granular terms, the SJC must determine which digital case records will be 
available to the public through the internet by weighing the tradition and laws 
regarding transparency of court operations against the risks of providing instant and 
enduring access to private details of litigants’ and nonparties’ lives. This is not only 
about whether the media gets details for an individual story or may publish the 
photograph to facilitate community safety, it is about how and when the media, in 
its role of informing the public, and members of the public themselves are able to 
monitor the operations of a powerful and vital branch of government.  It is not just 
whether a litigant can prevent reports of her child’s temporary bed-wetting from 
being available for broadcast across social media platforms and becoming part of 
his permanent digital identity, it is also about protecting those seeking justice and 
others brought into lawsuits from unnecessary risk and indignities.75 
For the SJC, figuring out how and where to strike the right balance between 
privacy and transparency in the midst of a fast-evolving internet environment, is an 
extremely difficult and complex task.  The internet is largely unregulated, and its 
implications for individuals and society are not fully understood.  The task is similar 
to changing the wheels on a moving car, one traveling on unfamiliar roads that are 
continually changing.  Given the individual, societal and institutional stakes 
involved, it is imperative that the SJC adopt an effective and appropriate legal 
framework for judicial balancing and decision-making. 
II. WHY JUDGE COFFIN? 
Decades of working for the public good in all three branches of government 
                                                                                                     
71  EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 112-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Samuel D. Warren 
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890)). 
72  Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2014). 
73  Id. at 7. 
74  Id.  
75  O’Hanlon, supra note 2, at 130. 
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endowed Judge Coffin with “special sensibilities” regarding justice.76  Judge 
Coffin’s concept of justice included recognition that evolutionary changes in 
institutional and social conventions were inextricably tied to an individual’s ability 
to have meaningful access to avenues of redress.77  Aware of implicit bias and the 
humanity of judges and the role-based constraints imposed upon the judiciary, Judge 
Coffin took seriously the need for an “intellectually consistent framework for judicial 
decision-making in cases not resolved by precedent or craft alone.”78  Nonetheless 
he believed that judges could be trusted to work within their sphere, and members of 
the bar should take responsibility for identifying social deficits, proposing solutions, 
and advocating for the most vulnerable people.79  
In addition to his substantial contributions to the jurisprudence and operations 
of the First Circuit,80 Judge Coffin was one of Maine’s foremost advocates for 
justice.81  In the mid-1990s, Judge Coffin leveraged his diplomatic skills and status 
as a respected jurist to help Maine “respond to a crisis” caused by a dramatic 
reduction in congressional “funding for legal service programs, and statutory 
restrictions on the kind of work that legal services programs receiving federal funds 
could perform.”82  Under his leadership, Maine professionals came together to create 
an enduring infrastructure focused on access to justice.83  
Following a “Fall Forum on the Future of Legal Services” spawned by the 
funding crisis and seeking to build upon the extensive work of Senator Muskie’s 
Legal Needs Commission,84 “Chief Justice [Wathen] created a group called the 
Justice Action Group (JAG)” to coordinate the efforts of many to assure the 
continued availability of civil legal services in Maine.85  Although JAG would 
necessarily focus on state court issues because “most of the individuals in need of 
                                                                                                     
76  Hon. Robert A. Katzmann, Frank Coffin and Enlightened Governance, 63 ME. L. REV. 391, 392 
(2011). 
77  Hon. Frank M. Coffin, What It Means to be a Federal Appellate Judge, Address to Luncheon for 
Newer Judges National Workshop for Appellate Judges (Feb. 8, 1993) in Hon. Daniel E. Wathen & 
Barbara Riegelhaupt, The Speeches of Frank M. Coffin: A Sideline to Judging, 63 ME. L. REV. 467, 506 
(2011). 
78  William C. Kelly Jr., In His Own Words: Judge Coffin and Workability, 63 ME. L. REV. 453, 460 
(2011). 
79  Hon. Frank M. Coffin, Introduction: Accessing Justice—Its Past, Present, and Future, 62 ME. L. 
REV. 421, 422 (2010). 
80  See generally Hon. Levin Campbell, Coffin's Court: A Colleague's View, 63 ME. L. REV. 417 (2011).  
81  While Judge Coffin would be the first to acknowledge and recognize the significant contributions of 
others, a description of those efforts in Maine is beyond the scope of this article. See Coffin, supra note 
77, at 422; see also Hon. Howard Dana, Legal Aid and Legal Services: An Overview, 67 ME. L. REV. 
275, 280 (2015); Hon. Jon D. Levy, The World Is Round: Why We Must Assure Equal Access to Civil 
Justice, 62 ME. L. REV. 561, 568-69 (2010); Diana Scully, Maine's Justice Action Group: Past 
Accomplishments and Preparing for the Future, 30 ME. B. J. 7 (2015). 
82  Hon. Kermit V. Lipez, Reflections of an Access to Justice Chair, 62 ME. L. REV. 585, 586-87 (2010). 
83  JUSTICE ACTION GROUP, JUSTICE FOR ALL 5 (2007), 
http://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/Rpts/kf336_ z99m23_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8Q9-2JVZ]. 
84  Dana, supra note 81, at 280; MAINE COMM’N ON LEGAL NEEDS, AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE 1990’S 1 
(1990), http://legislature.maine.gov/lawlib [https://perma.cc/T76A-CKR2]; Wendy F. Rau, Comment, 
The Unmet Legal Needs of the Poor in Maine: Is Mandatory Pro Bono the Answer?, 43 ME. L. REV. 
235 (1991). 
85  Dana, supra note 81, at 280; Calien Lewis, How Volunteers Saved Legal Aid in the 1990s, 11, ME 
POLICY REV. 44, 45 (2002).  
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free legal services deal with state law issues, Judge Coffin believed that the federal 
and state judiciaries shared an obligation to address access to justice issues.”86  Hence 
JAG began as a federal-state partnership,87 and Judge Coffin agreed to be its first 
chair (serving from 1995-2000).88 
Relying on his well-established “interests in the continued development of the 
law within society and the dignity of his fellow human beings,” and a fine sense of 
humor,89 Judge Coffin inspired a coalition of leaders of Maine’s legal community, 
including state and federal judges, legislative leaders, nonprofit civil legal aid 
providers, and practicing attorneys; along with the University of Maine School of 
Law, the Maine Bar Foundation, the Maine State Bar Association, the Maine Trial 
Lawyers Association, and others to take definitive action to assure the continued 
availability of civil legal services in Maine throughout the bleakest of times.90  JAG 
had many early successes, including the creation of the Maine Equal Justice Project 
(representing low income citizens before the Legislature) and Maine Equal Justice 
Partners (pro bono lawyers engaging in class actions and other systemic advocacy); 
the enactment of legislation directing surcharges from filing fees and traffic fines to 
provide funding for legal services for the poor; the establishment of private-law-firm 
funded public interest fellowships to help low income families; resource sharing 
among legal service providers; and proposing systemic changes within the court 
system to increase the likelihood that those citizens who cannot afford a lawyer will 
receive justice.91 
Today, JAG remains at the center of Maine’s access to justice initiatives. And, 
threads of Judge Coffin’s life works are woven into current Maine Justice Foundation 
and Justice Action Group activities.92  For example, a fellowship that provides legal 
representation in family law matters to clients through the Volunteer Lawyers 
Project, named in his honor (Coffin Family Law Fellowship), continues.93  
Additionally, a loan repayment program was set up to allow new attorneys to pursue 
careers in public service by providing them with assistance in repaying their law 
school debts.94  As a means of educating the Legislature and other policy makers 
about the needs of the poor, JAG commissioned a 2016 study about the Economic 
Impact of Civil Legal Aid Services in Maine.  And, the University of Maine School 
of Law continues to host the Frank M. Coffin Lecture on Law & Public Service, an 
annual event that brings nationally recognized presenters to Maine to explain their 
work for social justice.95  
Knowing all of this about Judge Coffin’s background and his distinguished 
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record as an advocate for justice, one still has to ask why he would be interested in 
the subject of digital court records access.  Judge Coffin spent most of his active 
working years as an appellate judge during the decades of the last century prior to 
the full unleashing of the internet, well before the arrival of Google, social media, 
the iPhone and most of the other present day digital surveillance technologies which 
are being used by organizations around the world to collect vast troves of personal 
data.96  Consequently, he did not have occasion to author any judicial opinions that 
addressed the rights of the individual against the state specifically in the context of 
privacy and public access to government records in the new digital age.97   
That said, however, he was well versed in balancing the competing interests of 
privacy and transparency, particularly in the context of criminal proceedings.  
Looking back at all of his judicial decisions over the course of his career, Judge 
Coffin designated In re Globe Newspaper Co.98 as one of his landmark cases.99  In 
that case, the First Circuit found that the privacy and fair trial interests of the 
defendants outweighed the public’s interest in having access to the bail proceedings 
in a pending criminal trial.  It held that closure of the bail proceedings was necessary, 
reasoning that “[t]he privacy interest that attends the [contents of conversations 
intercepted by electronic surveillance carried out pursuant to the federal wiretap 
statute] cannot be protected by any method other than preventing the material’s 
disclosure to the public, since disclosure itself is the injury to be avoided.”100  
Notwithstanding his own “[increasing concern] that the devices of technology . 
. . which are intended to solve the problems of quantity and expedition may divert 
our energies from the goal of the highest quality of justice,”101 he was acutely aware 
of the “new rights or protections which time, society, and technology have identified 
as being in the essential spirit and intendment of the Constitution.”102  Aware of the 
historic role of the judiciary as the protector of individual liberties, Judge Coffin also 
wrote in the hope of persuading other judges to apply a rights-sensitive balancing 
process, especially in the “hard cases.” 
In his writings and speeches, Judge Coffin predicted that appellate judges in the 
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years ahead would increasingly be called upon to deal with cases involving questions 
of individual rights versus societal interests where the outcome of the decision is not 
clearly determined by preexisting principles, rules, or precedents.103  He anticipated 
the “agonizing constitutional issues” that will lie ahead “as technology continues its 
breathtaking development,” and he could “foresee . . . a continuing passion for justice 
in this already justice-oriented society and an increasing willingness to impose on 
those with power the responsibility for interpreting and applying the basic tenets of 
the Constitution in their critical confrontation with powerless individuals.”104   
As an advocate for justice, Judge Coffin sought to ensure that all Maine citizens 
are able to enjoy access to the courts and that they actually get to experience 
meaningful justice once inside the courthouse.105  With the state court system’s 
transition from paper to electronic records, he undoubtedly would want to make sure 
that the privacy rights of citizens were not being stripped away when they entered 
the courthouse door.  In particular, he would be attuned to the need to protect the 
unrepresented, minorities, the poor and other acutely vulnerable people in our 
population, the very people for whom he had fought so hard to ensure their access to 
the courts.  He would understand the critical importance of finding the right balance 
between transparency and privacy and would look for a way to prevent and mitigate 
the possible privacy harms, injustices and indignities that could be inflicted on 
individuals as a consequence of making private, intimate details of people’s lives 
available on the internet for all to see and to use, forever, for any purpose whatsoever 
and with complete impunity.  
If he were alive today, Judge Coffin would be closely watching how the SJC 
goes about the task of managing the transition from paper to electronic records, if for 
no other reason than to protect those who are seemingly alone in the fight against the 
“disintegration by alienation of large sectors of society.”106  In particular, he would 
want to examine the way in which the SJC approaches judicial balancing as well as 
understand the rationale for the SJC’s decision as to where to draw the line.  In other 
words, he would be interested in keeping an eye on the decision-making process 
itself as well as the substantive outcome and the SJC’s reasoning.107  
To promote public trust and confidence in the court system, Judge Coffin urged 
appellate judges to be open and candid about their rationale in making decisions.108  
For Judge Coffin, transparency was about giving the public the opportunity to 
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understand, monitor, and feel confident about the work of the judiciary.109    
If he were here today, I have no doubt he would find a respectful way in which 
to nudge very graciously (and maybe with some humor) the Justices of the Supreme 
Judicial Court to be more forthcoming about the research, reasons, and realities 
informing their conclusions about court records access in Maine.  He might remind 
them of their own powerful words introducing one of their top three strategic 
priorities for 2018-2019:  
Public trust and confidence in the judiciary is a critical aspect of the rule of law and 
the enforcement of judicial decisions. In addition, lack of such trust and confidence 
may affect funding decisions and result in a limitation on the public’s access to 
justice. State and national surveys of public attitudes indicate that the work of courts 
is poorly understood and that significant percentages of the public have concerns 
about the timeliness and cost of bringing a case to court and about fairness of 
treatment concerning diversity. The Maine Judicial Branch must continually . . . 
work to enhance the public’s understanding of its operations and the vital role it 
plays in our democracy.110  
And, he would ask them to offer the public a window into their court record 
access decision-making on the macro-level and a road map through all its component 
parts.  In brief, he would remind them of the benefits of more transparency in their 
decision-making process, even in rulemaking and policy-formation. 
Faced with the difficult and complex substantive issues arising in the context of 
the Maine court system’s changeover to electronic records, Judge Coffin would 
endeavor “to understand the facts . . . know the pertinent law” and “keep an eye 
cocked on the purpose of sensible policy” in order to “‘try to forward that policy 
without doing violence to what has been understood in the past’ . . . and ‘make clear 
the reasons for the decision.”111   He would apply his well-established “rights-
sensitive balancing process” and “rigorous analysis . . . of the details of the individual 
and governmental interests at stake when they clash”112 to resolve these complex and 
difficult issues to ensure “[that all persons] shall have remedy by due course of law; 
and right and justice shall be administered freely and without sale, completely and 
without denial, promptly and without delay.”113 
III. JUDICIAL BALANCING 
Judge Coffin’s philosophy of judicial balancing is one of the most valuable gifts 
he has bequeathed to us.   His insightful articles, lectures and speeches114 contain 
many important lessons and teach us about the essential elements of an effective 
approach to judicial decision-making, one that he advocated could be used by 
appellate judges in the “hard cases” involving human rights and civil liberties.  The 
framework he advanced is equally relevant today, if not more so.  
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In sharing his thoughts with those who would listen, Judge Coffin was motivated 
by his desire “to improve the quality of citizenship,” “[to improve] the quality of 
judges and their work,” and to find the “approach most likely to accomplish” the 
“most elusive mission [of all judges, state and federal, trial and appellate] [namely] 
that of safeguarding individual rights in a majoritarian society with due regard to the 
legitimate interests of that society.”115  
In The Ways of a Judge, for example, he invited the public “to come behind the 
bench and spend some time in an appellate judge’s chambers”116 in order “to get a 
good close-up glimpse of what happens at each stage of decision-making.”117  He 
extended this invitation to the public with the “hope [of offering] some insights into 
the judging process and attempt[ing] to answer how [judges] can do this vastly 
complex job better, and how it can be recognized as better by ‘We the people.’”118   
As a long-term participant in civic life, Judge Coffin understood the interplay 
and separate functions of the legislative and judicial branches.119  He discovered that 
the “key to a more realistic relationship” between the judicial and legislative 
branches “lies . . . in courts doing what they think they have to do . . . and legislatures 
doing what they think they have to do.”120  In coming to that conclusion, Judge Coffin 
recognized that “[i]t is a formula calculated to create tension.”  For that reason, he 
did “not see justice as accurately represented by such a static, inert symbol as a set 
of scales.”  Rather, he saw the appropriate image of justice as “a coiled spring whose 
tension yields to and limits the pressures of a majoritarian government on one side 
and the demands on behalf of individual rights on the other.”121 
Judge Coffin presented in detail his philosophy of judicial balancing in a number 
of his articles, lectures and speeches, including the James Madison Lecture on 
Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law on November 19, 1987.  
In delivering the lecture, Judge Coffin expounded on what he saw as some of the 
problems with how judges decide cases that require the balancing of an individual’s 
interests against the interests of the government.  He observed that “[a]ll too 
commonly in judicial opinions, lip service is paid to balancing, a cursory mention of 
opposing interests is made, and, presto, the ‘balance’ is arrived at through some 
unrevealed legerdemain.”122  He proposed that it was “therefore high time to 
stimulate a more self-conscious, systematic, sensitive, comprehensive, and open 
effort at balancing.”123       
In the lecture Judge Coffin advanced a thoughtful and disciplined framework for 
achieving a “fully realized balancing process.”  He described the key components of 
his proposed process as these: stating the issue so as “to avoid tilting the balance at 
the very outset;”124 assembling a factual account that is “broad enough to support the 
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range of interests analyzed;”125 conducting an interest analysis that is not 
“perfunctory or conclusory;”126 determining “the proper level of generality with 
which to decide a case;127 and establishing the appropriateness or ‘fit’ of the rule 
being challenged to the circumstances.128   
In addition, Judge Coffin conceived the idea of “workability”129 and considered 
it as an integral step in his proposed framework.  He described “workability” as a 
way to factor into the process “the extent to which a rule protecting a right, enforcing 
a duty, or setting a standard of conduct – which is consistent with and in the interests 
of social justice – can be pronounced with reasonable expectation of effective 
observance without impairing the essential functioning of those to whom the rule 
applies.”130  He noted that the use of workability “couples a sensitivity to individual 
rights with an equal sensitivity to administrative capability to carry out institutional 
missions while affording optimum respect for those rights.”131  Applying this concept 
would make it possible for judges to decide cases by taking individual rights 
seriously without unduly disrupting the core functioning of public bodies.132    
As a threshold matter, Judge Coffin observed that two essential qualities of 
judicial decision-making – openness and carefulness – “must permeate the 
[balancing] process” if it is to be fully realized.  He noted: 
[W]hat a judge really does in his mind in reaching a decision should appear on paper. 
Opinion writing should reflect the thought processes of the writer and of those 
colleagues joining in the opinion. Unless real reasons are laid on the table, there is 
no chance for a meaningful response or any useful dialogue.  Moreover, . . . hope 
for minimizing the effect of subjective bias depends on openness. I recognize that 
at times the only way to get majority agreement is to be opaque, but this should be 
the exception.133   
Further, he wrote that judges must apply “craftsmanlike attention to detail at 
every stage of balancing.  This includes a continuing alertness to temptation to rely 
on facile assumptions, and a resistance to unjustified generalization.”134  
With respect to the first step of the process – identification of the issue so as “to 
avoid tilting the balance at the very outset” – Judge Coffin cautioned that “the way 
most courts and judges express the basic choice . . . conceals an implicit utilitarian 
bias. To the extent that a conflict is seen as one between the interest of a lone 
individual and that of all the rest of us, the result is pretty well foreshadowed.”135  By 
engaging in such a functional calculus, he noted, courts fail to “give society credit 
for having any interest in preserving individual rights . . . . If a protectable individual 
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right is at stake, society has a genuine interest in that right, as well as the individual; 
both interests must then be weighed against the countervailing institutional interest 
of society.”136   
To counteract such implicit bias and as a counter measure “to avoid tilting the 
balance at the very outset,” Judge Coffin urged judges to remember that:   
[t]he particular case is always, by definition, a case involving public interests on 
both sides.  And society has as much interest in the vindication of any right that the 
Constitution has given (or reserved) to the individual as it has in the proper (not 
merely efficient) functioning of government.  A judicial balancing that includes this 
thought in identifying the issue starts on the right track, avoids tilting the scales 
before the weighing begins, and increases the chances for sensitive discourse and 
perhaps even a narrowing of the differences.137  
As Judge Coffin pointed out, Justice Brennan sounded the same note in his 
dissent in a noteworthy Fourth Amendment case decided in the October 1984 Term, 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., emphasizing the fact that “[t]he balance is not between the 
rights of the government and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing concepts 
of the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying out the government’s varied 
responsibilities.”138   
As an example of a case involving contrasting identification of issues, Judge 
Coffin pointed to Bowers v. Hardwick.139  He saw that case as an instance “where 
the majority and minority of the Court [saw] the issue quite differently and, 
accordingly, march[ed] off in opposite directions without acknowledging the other 
position.”140  He explained:  
In that case, a homosexual challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia sodomy 
statute. The majority framed the issue as ‘whether the Federal Constitution confers 
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates 
the laws of the many states that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for 
a very long time.’  The dissent sharply criticized that formulation and countered: 
"[T]his case is about ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued 
by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.’”141 
Although the majority and the dissent each invoked precedents in the law of 
privacy, Judge Coffin noted that “[t]he majority deemed them confined to family or 
first amendment concerns . . . [whereas] the dissent stressed their connection with 
the sanctity of the home, self-definition and freedom to choose ways of living.”142 
As a consequence of the majority and minority each viewing the issue so differently, 
“there was no shared dialogue on the values underlying the precedents standing for 
privacy.”143   
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With respect to interest analysis, “[t]he heart of rights-conscious balancing,”144 
Judge Coffin described this step in the process in this way:    
What ought to take place is not only identification of the individual right at stake, 
but also evaluation of its centrality and importance, focusing on the extent to which 
it is likely to be infringed and the frequency of infringement—the size of the 
problem, so to speak. This is a subset of things to be considered in ‘weighing the 
plaintiff's interest.’ Of course, there is no magic scale that will yield the proper 
weight for comparison, but to the extent that a variety of questions is asked, the 
balancing process is strengthened.145  
To facilitate interest analysis, Judge Coffin counseled that a “better factual base 
for identifying and describing interests would immeasurably improve balancing.”146  
A common problem he found in balancing is the “sparseness of . . . facts going 
beyond the actual happenings in the case, to help identify the interests and convey 
some idea of their importance and how they are threatened, or burdened by possible 
actions the court might take.”147  He believed the lack of a sufficient factual base was 
“largely a problem of [judges’] own making,” explaining that “[w]e judges so often 
blandly assume that we know (or that ‘everyone knows’) what the conditions of life 
and work are, what people fear, expect, and hold dear, and what motivates them . . . 
. But in truth, our view is limited.”148   
When looking at the appropriateness of the rule being challenged in deciding 
contests between individual rights and state or societal interests, Judge Coffin was 
mindful of the more than sixty-four “specific freedom-protective provisions” in the 
Constitution, with its amendments, and often looked to his “cardinal” beacons of 
liberty and equality for direction.149  Judge Coffin recognized that when “[s]een as a 
connected whole, the spirit [of the Constitution, with its amendments] is the same 
throughout.  It is a spirit of unqualified devotion to human rights, human dignity, the 
liberty and equality of free men.”150  Importantly, he recognized that beyond 
consumerism, “there is a deeper value assigned to personal liberty in the senses of 
privacy, autonomy, and life-style” making “access to government, including the 
courts, fairness in institutional proceedings, equality of consideration and treatment, 
and residual privacy . . . increasingly cherished individual objectives.”151  He also 
understood that “there are new rights or protections which time, society, and 
technology have identified as being within the essential spirit and intendment of the 
Constitution.152  
In the same vein,153  Judge Coffin viewed as sound the proposition advanced by 
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Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent in Meachum v. Fano,154 that “ours [is] a 
government in which rights existed in individuals unless they were taken away by 
positive law, rather than that they did not exist unless they were specifically granted 
by positive law.”155  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens expressed “concern not 
merely with the result but with the approach taken [by the majority], which 
recognized that a liberty interest could have only two sources – the Constitution or a 
state law.”156  Justice Stevens wrote that “neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of 
sovereign States create the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The 
relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to 
infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either create property 
rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered 
society.”157  
Judge Coffin also looked favorably at recent developments in the law at the state 
level as “enhanc[ing] the possibility of a more sensitive identification of individual 
rights and delineation of protections.”158 Noting the increasing willingness of state 
courts to go beyond the boundaries of rights staked out by the Supreme Court, he 
observed that “[a] kind of ‘inverse federalism’ is taking place; state courts are now 
frequently setting the pace and direction. State constitutional texts, histories, and 
traditions have created a special framework, and recent constitutional revisions and 
amendments have given more precise, current, and authoritative sanction for what 
have been called ‘new states' rights.’”159 
With respect to determining “the proper level of generality with which to decide 
a case,” another key step in the process, Judge Coffin was a proponent for replacing 
“broad, bright-line pronouncements” with “cautious, incremental decision-making, 
reached by detailed, careful, open balancing.”160  In doing so, he noted “[t]he 
attractions [of broad, bright-line pronouncements] are obvious; with a few deft 
swoops the Court can ‘settle’ the law in an entire area. But this seems intuitively 
wrong to me. . . . To me justice is something we approach better on a retail than a 
wholesale basis.”161   
Judge Coffin’s preference for “incrementalism”162 as part of the decision-
making process aligned with his desire to ensure continual dialogue in dealing with 
the “agonizing constitutional issues” that he foresaw would arise “as [he] look[ed] 
ahead,” predicting that “[t]he domain of privacy in an ever more crowded and 
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computerized world will . . . be fertile ground.”163  As if to emphasize the point, he 
likened the judicial balancing process, if done effectively, to the common human 
experience of having a “candid, civil, open conversation,” agreeing with the 
observation of Professor Michelman that:  
adoption of the balancing standard commits [a judge] to the Court's and the country's 
project of resolving normative disputes by conversation, a communicative practice 
of open and intelligible reason-giving, as opposed to self-justifying impulse and ipse 
dixit . . . . The balancing test, with its contextual focus, solicits future conversation, 
by allowing for resolution of this case without predetermining so many others that 
one ‘side’ experiences large-scale victory or defeat.164  
The insight into the similarity between effective judicial balancing and having a 
“candid, civil, open conversation” is profound and instructive.  As noted by Judge 
Coffin, it fits “closely into what Professor James Boyd White has characterized as 
Justice Brandeis's vision of the Constitution as a central means to the continual 
process of education that engages both the individual and the community.”165  
Professor White wrote that “[t]he community makes and remakes itself in a 
conversation over time - a translation and retranslation - that is deeply democratic . . 
.  in the sense that in it we can build, over time, a community and a culture that will 
enable us to acquire knowledge and to hold values of a sort that would otherwise be 
impossible.”166 
In the pages that follow, I attempt to put some of Judge Coffin’s ideas into action 
to see how they might apply to the subject of digital court records access.  Building 
on the idea of a “candid, civil, open conversation,” I envision Judge Coffin meeting 
with members of JAG to discuss this topic and using Judge Coffin’s rights-sensitive 
judicial balancing process as a guide for the discussion.  In doing so, I have tried to 
capture some of what I have learned about Judge Coffin’s generous spirit, 
personality, humor and style.  
IV. BRINGING JUDGE COFFIN INTO THE CONVERSATION  
Judge Coffin’s framework for judicial decision-making in the “hard cases” can 
and should serve as a model for the SJC in determining what procedural court rules 
and administrative orders to adopt governing digital court records access in Maine.  
A rights-sensitive judicial balancing process, one permeated with the qualities of 
openness and carefulness and that addresses each of the critical areas described by 
Judge Coffin, is as applicable to determining court rules as it is to deciding the hard 
cases, especially where, as here, the SJC is operating in new, uncharted territory 
involving the balancing of individual and societal interests.  Effective judicial 
balancing is required in both contexts.  
                                                                                                     
163  JUDICIAL BALANCING, supra note 104, at 41-42 (emphasis added). 
164  JUDICIAL BALANCING, supra note 104, at 41(quoting Frank I, Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 
Term – Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986) (omissions in original). 
165  Id. 
166  Id. (quoting James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835, 867 (1986).  
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Accordingly, in this Part, in the spirit of state-federal amity,167 and in celebration 
of his centennial birth, I envision inviting Judge Coffin to meet with JAG to discuss 
the subject of digital court records access.  I imagine members of JAG, including its 
chair, Hon. Andrew M. Mead168 and vice-chair, Hon. John H. Rich III,169 as being 
keenly interested in hearing the questions that he might ask and listening to the 
observations and thoughts that he might share, both in terms of the decision-making 
process itself and the substantive issues.   
Lest anyone think that, by asking him to participate in the discussion I am 
looking to Judge Coffin to provide the answer as to where to draw the line in 
balancing privacy and transparency interests, I am not.  Even if it were possible to 
predict Judge Coffin’s decision, which would be presumptuous, that is not my 
purpose here.  My purpose, rather, is much more modest.  I seek simply to 
demonstrate the importance and value of applying Judge Coffin’s rights-sensitive 
judicial balancing approach to address the topic of digital court records access, one 
of the most difficult and complex problems facing the SJC today.  By way of spoiler 
alert, neither Judge Coffin (channeled through me) nor I intend to answer any of the 
difficult questions that are raised during the session.170  At least not in this essay.            
Of course, by inviting Judge Coffin to get involved, I am mindful of the salutary 
effects of his presence.  His participation, as faithfully proven over the years, will 
get people’s attention, enliven and enrich the discussion, and underscore the 
importance of giving more serious and thoughtful consideration to the issues.  As the 
Honorable Daniel Wathen and Barbara Riegelhaupt astutely observed:  
 
For many years in Maine, the foolproof way to signal the importance of an event or 
ensure the success of a conference in the legal world was to invite Frank Coffin to 
deliver the keynote address.  If you already had a keynote speaker of national 
renown, you would invite Judge Coffin to introduce the speaker.  His introductions 
were as highly anticipated as the speech that followed, and they were as likely to 
entertain and enlighten the audience.171 
Set forth in the remainder of this Part is how I imagine the conversation might 
actually begin to unfold.172 
A. Setting the Stage 
Judge Coffin graciously accepted the invitation to meet with JAG, although 
disclaiming any expertise in the subject of digital court records.  He was not 
                                                                                                     
167  “The concept that we have a two-tier court system consisting of a first and second class must be 
eradicated.  We must get back to Hamilton’s concept of ONE WHOLE.” ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 
319. 
168  Associate Justice, Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 
169  Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the District of Maine.  
170  As relayed to the author by the Honorable Daniel Wathen: “We can guess what [Judge Coffin’s] 
questions might be but never his answers.  His approach, however, is valuable.”  
171  Wathen & Riegelhaupt, supra note 77, at 468.   
172  The remainder of this Part is written in Judge Coffin’s style of using fable and fiction. See Id. at 
469, 484-490, 497-507.  Having acknowledged here that the conversation about to be relayed is the 
product of my imagination, I dispense from using such redundant qualifiers as “I imagine,” “I think,” 
and “I believe” in describing the conversation.  
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computer savvy but was well aware of JAG’s vision of “a future where every resident 
of the State of Maine, regardless of their economic or social circumstances, enjoys 
equal justice under law,” so he wanted to help if he could.  And JAG’s interest in 
exploring the records issue from the perspective of rights-sensitive judicial 
balancing intrigued him.  He therefore overcame his doubts about his ability to offer 
useful insights.  
The session took place in the Moot Court Room of the Law School, a location 
that brought back good memories for Judge Coffin, as he had taught seminars at the 
Law School.  Participating in the discussion were Magistrate Judge Rich (“Judge 
Rich”), representatives from each of the six core nonprofit civil legal aid providers 
(“LSP1-6”), a number of prominent Maine attorneys (“Attorney1-2”), several Bar 
Fellows, and a Professor from the University of Maine School of Law (“Professor”).  
A few curious law students passing by entered and took seats in the back of the room, 
sensing that something important might be about to happen.  
After the exchange of greetings and other pleasantries, Judge Rich welcomed 
the group and offered Justice Mead’s sincere apologies for his absence.  That 
morning, the Maine State Legislature asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court to offer an Opinion173 about whether the Federal Trade Commission Act 
makes it impermissible for Maine to utilize the state Unfair Trade Practices Act as 
an enforcement mechanism for the recently enacted internet privacy law.174   All 
justices of the Supreme Judicial Court were called together quickly to determine if 
they were constitutionally permitted to answer and, if so, to undertake a careful 
analysis and provide a response to the question posed.   
Justice Mead asked Victoria Phipps (a recent law school graduate and great 
granddaughter of Samuel D. Warren), the MJB’s new Court Operations Legal 
Process Manager, to attend the meeting in his place and to report back on what 
transpired.  After introducing Ms. Phipps, Judge Rich turned the meeting over to 
Judge Coffin.  Judge Coffin observed that the first step is to identify the issue to be 
decided.  Even that preliminary step, he cautioned, would benefit from a “fully-
realized balancing process.”  He urged the participants to express their thoughts 
openly, with their “real reasons . . . laid on the table” to encourage meaningful 
response and useful dialogue and with an “alertness to temptation to rely on facile 
assumptions, and a resistance to unjustified generalization.”175  
B. Identification of the Issue176   
Phipps:  In June 2018, after the SJC announced its decision to “make available 
on the internet” most digital case records, the SJC sought input on the critical, narrow 
issue of “identifying which records are public.”177  
                                                                                                     
173  ME. CONST. Art. VI, § 3  
174  P.L. 2019, ch. 216, § 9301; see generally Peter J. Guffin & Kyle M. Noonan, Maine’s New Internet 
Privacy Law in Brief, ME. LAWYERS REV. (June 27, 2019).  
175  JUDICIAL BALANCING, supra at note 104, at 23. 
176  The history of the study of digital court records access in Maine, including the SJC’s various 
formulations of the issue to be decided, is discussed in more detail in Part 2 of this essay. Part II, supra.   
177 Judicial Branch Transparency and Privacy Task Force, STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, PUBLIC 
HEARING, PART I, 4:20 (JUNE 7, 2018) http://player.netromedia.com/?ID=d95e0789-438b-4882-b845-
116 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
Attorney1:  More recently, however, in a bill submitted to the Legislature in 
2019, the SJC declared that “[a]ccess to electronic court records by the public is the 
presumption.  Electronic court records that are not designated confidential, private, 
closed, sealed or otherwise not public records by state or federal statute or by court 
rule or order must be publicly accessible.”178    
Attorney2:  In 2004, at the time of TECRA, the SJC stated that it was seeking 
recommendations for the “promulgation of rules, orders, statutes, or policies that will 
have the effect of allowing the broadest of public access to court records that can be 
achieved while balancing the competing goals of public safety, personal privacy, and 
the integrity of the court system.”179   
Professor:  The TECRA and TAP formulations of the issue are similar.  In 2017, 
the SJC said it was looking for “clear guidelines and rules related to the access to the 
wide variety of court records”180 which balance transparency “against the recognition 
that public access to certain personal information contained in court files is not 
appropriate and that specific types of personal information, if released publicly, can 
lead to identity theft or other harms.” 181    
Judge Coffin:  It appears the SJC has sought to frame the issue differently over 
the years.  
Phipps:  I would agree with that characterization, at least based on the SJC’s 
public-facing statements. 
Judge Coffin:  Has the SJC offered an explanation for the changes in how it has 
formulated the issue? 
Phipps:  Not to my knowledge, at least not publicly. 
Judge Coffin:  I recommend we begin with the SJC’s most recent statement of 
the issue, in which it said the narrow issue to be decided is identifying which records 
are public.  Does this formulation unfairly tilt the balance at the outset? 
Professor:  By itself, the statement seems neutral.  But we must keep in mind 
that the SJC explicitly coupled this formulation with two other statements.  It 
declared that most court records would be available on the internet, and that there is 
a presumption of access to court records by the public.  When combined together 
into a single formulation, these statements no longer are neutral.  They tilt the balance 
in favor of open access.  
Judge Coffin:  How should we revise the formulation? 
Professor:  The issue to be decided needs to identify the key interests that must 
be reconciled.  It also should say something about the different context – namely the 
internet – in which the SJC is balancing those interests.     
Judge Coffin:  What are the interests at stake?  
Professor:  The two primary interests the SJC is talking about are privacy and 
transparency.  We need to balance both of those interests in determining appropriate 
                                                                                                     
8f8b6434f873&path=/_definst_/donotdelete/tap_hearing_part_1.m4a&radio=true&html5=true 
[https://perma.cc/S9UE-KVY5].  
178  L.D. 1759 (129th Legis. 2019). 
179  TECRA REPORT, supra note 32, app. at 2.   
180  MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH TASK FORCE ON TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY IN COURT RECORDS 
CHARTER 1-2 (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/tap/charter-
tap.pdf [https://perma.cc/X85E-4U6B]. 
181  Id.  
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rules for public access to digital court records. 
LSP1:  Social justice and access to justice interests also must be factored into 
any decision regarding access.  
Professor:  Excellent point.  I think everyone here would agree about the 
importance of those interests.  I recommend stating the issue to be decided in this 
way:  In drafting rules regarding public access to electronic court records, and 
desiring to ensure that such rules do not diminish the privacy rights and expectations 
of Maine citizens, how should the SJC go about balancing the privacy interests of 
the individual and the state’s interest in providing transparency about the SJC’s 
operations?    
Judge Coffin:  That seems to be a good, neutral starting point.  Let’s go with 
that formulation.  I propose that we turn now to an analysis of the privacy and 
transparency interests and then examine the questions:  What is “public” 
information?  Where does the privacy interest end?  
C. Interest Analysis 
Judge Coffin:  With respect to privacy and transparency, what are the individual 
and societal values we are trying to preserve?  In advancing these interests, what are 
the goals we are trying to achieve?  How important and central are these interests to 
democracy?     
Professor:  With respect to privacy, I think the fundamental values we are trying 
to protect are liberty and equality.  Individual privacy is an integral element of 
liberty. 
Attorney1:  Without privacy there can be no freedom.   
Professor:  The right to privacy, even though not expressly guaranteed, is 
indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights explicitly enumerated in the United 
States Constitution.  Without protection of an individual’s privacy, many of the 
freedoms guaranteed to United States citizens, such as those enshrined in the First 
Amendment, could be eviscerated. 
Attorney1:  Individual privacy fosters the democratic values of self-autonomy 
and self-determination. 
Judge Coffin:  Connecting privacy with the concept of freedom is an important 
idea.  It reinforces the fact that there are individual and societal dimensions to the 
privacy interest we are trying to protect.   
LSP1:  Individual privacy also promotes equality.  The erosion of privacy 
resulting from advances in technology has created an easy and attractive opening for 
the unfair and abusive manipulation and exploitation of people.  The poor and other 
disadvantaged members of our society are being hurt the most.  
LSP4:  The Legal Services for the Elderly, for example, regularly represents 
victims of financial exploitation.  Many of these individuals were targeted using 
information obtained online.182  
Attorney2:  An individual’s right to seek justice in the courts would lose much 
of its meaning if access to the court system was dependent on a waiver of the 
                                                                                                     
182  See CTAP Website, supra note 49, Comments by Legal Services for the Elderly on Proposed 
Digital Court Records Access Act dated January 25, 2019 submitted to the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
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individual’s right to privacy resulting in the widespread and unrestricted 
dissemination of his or her sensitive personal information.  
Phipps:  I think the SJC would agree that liberty and equality are two of the 
most important values we are trying to protect.  With respect to the transparency 
interest, providing citizens with the information they need to be able to keep a 
watchful eye on the workings of the court system is the key value sought to be 
preserved.  The press has an important role in holding power to account.   
Judge Rich:  Historically, court proceedings and many types of paper court 
records have been presumptively open to the public to allow citizens to monitor the 
operations of government.183 
Judge Coffin:  What is the historical basis for the presumption and does that 
rationale still apply?   
Attorney1:  While it might have made sense in the paper world, the presumption 
of open access needs to be redefined if it is going to apply in the context of the 
internet and online public access to digital court records.     
Judge Coffin:  Why should we presume society’s interest in open access is 
superior to the privacy rights of the individual?   
Professor:  If we do, the presumption effectively pre-ordains the outcome, 
making it difficult for individuals to prevail.  It will produce outcomes in which 
society’s interest would be limited only for serious cause. 
Judge Coffin:  What if we presume the priority of individual rights?  A decision 
burdening the individual would then require a strong case of government need.   
Professor:  Should there be no presumption then, either way? 
Judge Coffin:  Good question.     
Attorney2:  I would argue that it is important to challenge longstanding 
presumptions from time to time.  They serve as shortcuts to get to an answer; they 
are not a substitute for the hard analysis. 
   Attorney1:  I agree.  Invoking presumptions is often used as a way to cut off 
meaningful dialogue and analysis.  Their usefulness as an aid in judicial decision-
making may fade with the passage of time.  They should be continually tested to 
make sure they remain aligned with the present day needs of society. 
Judge Coffin:  I agree.  
Professor: Putting aside presumptions, when balancing privacy and 
transparency, I think the important question that we need to ask is this: to what extent 
is the dissemination of personal information actually advancing society’s interest in 
transparency?   
 Judge Rich:  Now we are getting to the heart of the matter.  I would ask that 
question in this way:  When does the individual’s privacy interest end?  And when 
does the transparency interest begin?  
Judge Coffin:  I view open access and privacy as broad and expansive ideas 
that properly should be interpreted in context over time.  They require fresh thinking 
to be applied narrowly by judges on a case by case basis in the specific circumstances 
presented.  I once wrote:  
The emphasis on fairness, the entitlement of each person to equal respect, the view 
of the great clauses in the Bill of Rights as concepts, susceptible of adjustment in 
                                                                                                     
183  See supra Part I (discussion of the qualified right of access to court records under the common law). 
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each era rather than as fixed, specific conceptions, the recognition that the 
authoritative construction of these clauses in not the province of the majority, and 
the caution that the proper approach to individual rights is not simply a “balancing” 
of the rights of individuals against those of society, but rather a tilt toward the 
individual–all these spell a different, individual-oriented jurisprudence.184 
Attorney1:  The approach with respect to public access to digital court records 
should be aligned with citizens’ privacy rights and reasonable expectations, 
consistent with supporting the SJC’s stated mission to “administer justice by 
providing a safe, accessible, efficient and impartial system of dispute resolution that 
serves the public interest, protects individual rights, and instills respect for the 
law.”185 
Judge Coffin:  Is aggregate, compiled and bulk data about the operations of the 
court system sufficient to satisfy what the public needs from a transparency 
perspective? 
Phipps:  No.  I think everyone would agree that bulk and aggregate data is part 
of the information that the public needs, but the press would argue strenuously that 
it is not sufficient.        
Judge Coffin:  What are the constitutional law dimensions associated with the 
right of privacy and the right of access to court records?186   
Professor:  In Whalen v. Roe,187 the United States Supreme Court, recognizing 
a constitutional right of privacy, articulated two different kinds of interests to be 
afforded protection.  The first is “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters,”188 and the second is “the interest in independence in making 
certain kinds of important decisions.”189   
Judge Coffin:  Both interests seem likely to be implicated in any court rules the 
SJC decides to adopt regarding access to digital court records.  If individuals have to 
give up control over dissemination of their private, personal information, individuals 
may be discouraged from going to court and may decline to seek justice and relief 
through the courts. 
Professor:  Many federal circuit courts have recognized the constitutional right 
                                                                                                     
184  THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 101, at 240. 
185  STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.maine.gov [https://perma.cc/A9QC-QVPR] 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2020) (emphasis added). 
186  See Part I (discussing the qualified right of access to court records under the United States 
Constitution).  
187  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).  The issue in Whalen was whether the State had satisfied its 
duty to protect from unwarranted disclosure the sensitive, personal information of individuals which was 
being collected and used by the State in the exercise of its broad police powers.  Finding that the State’s 
“carefully designed program include[d] numerous safeguards intended to forestall the danger of 
indiscriminate disclosure,” and that “so far as the record shows,” the State had been “successful [in its] 
effort to prevent abuse and limit access to the personal information at issue,” the Court held that there 
was no impermissible “invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 
606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).  The Court was careful to state that its holding was limited to the 
specific facts presented, recognizing that the “central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data 
[which] vastly increase[s] the potential for abuse of that information,” Id. 
188  Id. at 599.  
189  Id. at 599-600. 
120 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
to information privacy.190 The Third Circuit has developed the most well-known test 
for deciding the constitutional right to information privacy cases.  In United States 
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the court articulated seven factors that “should be 
considered in deciding whether an intrusion into an individual’s privacy is justified”: 
(1) “the type of record requested”; (2) “the information it does or might contain”; (3) 
“the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure”; (4) “the injury 
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated”; (5) “the 
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure”; (6) “the degree of 
need”; and (7) “whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public 
policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access.”191 
Judge Coffin:  What about the Maine Constitution?  
Professor:  Although the Maine Constitution contains no express provisions 
protecting an individual’s right to privacy, the Natural Rights Clause, Article I, 
section 1, of the Maine Constitution arguably provides the basis for recognizing 
privacy as an independent and distinct constitutional right. It provides: 
Natural Rights.  All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain 
natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of 
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.192 
Judge Coffin:  Court rules adopted by the SJC seem likely to implicate affected 
individuals’ “natural, inherent and unalienable rights” under the Natural Rights 
Clause of the Maine Constitution, for much the same reason such rules seem likely 
to implicate the privacy interests recognized in Whalen.   
Attorney2:  The broad language of the Natural Rights Clause has no federal 
analogue, and it could support an argument that Maine’s Constitution provides 
broader privacy protections for individuals than does the U.S. Constitution.  The 
Maine Constitution has an existence independent of the U.S. Constitution. 
Professor:  There is no jurisprudence on the right to privacy under the Maine 
Constitution.  In other contexts, Maine’s courts have held that the Maine Constitution 
provides additional guarantees beyond those contained in the U.S. Constitution, as 
have many other states’ courts, such as New Hampshire, Vermont and 
Massachusetts.193   
                                                                                                     
190  See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 
188, 192  (4th Cir. 1990); Kimberlin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1986); 
Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 
1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).  
191  United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-80 (3d Cir. 1980). 
192  ME. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
193  See e.g., State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 169 (Me. 1974) (noting that the state constitution, but not the 
Federal Constitution, guarantees trial by jury for all criminal offenses and similar language of federal 
and state provisions is not dispositive); Danforth v. State Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 
800 (Me. 1973) (holding that the state constitution protects parent’s right to custody of child and that 
parent has due process right under the state constitution to court-appointed counsel although the Federal 
Constitution may not guarantee that right); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983) (analyzing state 
constitutional claim before turning to Federal Constitution, and concluding state constitution’s 
limitations on search and seizure were stricter than federal limitations); State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988 
(Vt. 1991) (stating that the Vermont Constitution provides more protection against government searches 
and seizures than does the Federal Constitution); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 
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Attorney2:  In other jurisdictions, state courts have found that almost identically 
worded provisions as appear in the Maine Constitution form the basis of state privacy 
claims.  In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized privacy as an independent 
and distinct right under the Georgia Constitution.  In Pavesich v. New England Life 
Insurance Co.,194 the Georgia Supreme Court found the state’s residents to have a 
“liberty of privacy” guaranteed by the Georgia constitutional provision: “no person 
shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law.”  The court grounded the 
right to privacy in the doctrine of natural law:   
The right of privacy has its foundations in the instincts of nature.  It is recognized 
intuitively, consciousness being witness that can be called to establish its existence.  
Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as to 
each individual member of society there are matters private and there are matters 
public so far as the individual is concerned.  Each individual as instinctively resents 
any encroachment by the public upon his rights which are of a private nature as he 
does the withdrawal of those rights which are of a public nature.  A right of privacy 
in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law.195   
Professor:  In addition, we know that at least eleven state constitutions contain 
explicit right-to-privacy clauses, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and 
Washington.196   
 Judge Coffin:  How has the legislative branch approached the balancing of 
privacy and transparency interests in the context of other government records?  It 
might be helpful to look at how Congress has approached the balancing of privacy 
and transparency in the context of federal government agency records.  There may 
be some lessons to learn (or borrow) from the legislative branch.  
  Judge Rich:  The Privacy Act of 1974197 (“Privacy Act”) and the Freedom of 
Information Act198 (“FOIA”) offer examples of how Congress sought to enable the 
complementary goals of safeguarding individual liberty and ensuring government 
accountability.  In enacting both statutes Congress sought to ensure that personal 
information collected and maintained by federal agencies would be properly 
protected while also seeking to ensure that public information in the possession of 
federal agencies would be widely available to the public. 
Judge Coffin:  My recollection is that there are a number of federal court 
decisions examining the interaction between the Privacy Act and FOIA.  The analysis 
in those cases might shed some useful light on the subject of where to draw the line 
in terms of digital court records access in Maine. 
Professor:  United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations 
                                                                                                     
1994) (interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution’s free exercise of religion clause as broader than 
federal protections). 
194  50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905). 
195  Id. at 69-70 
196  See ALASKA CONST art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. 
I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, 
§ 10; N.H. CONST. Part 1, art. 2-b; S.C. CONST. art. I, §10.  WASH. CONST. art. I, §7. 
197  5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018). 
198  Id. § 552. 
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Authority,199 provides a clear illustration of the interaction between the Privacy Act 
and FOIA.  There, two local unions requested the names and home addresses of 
employees in federal agencies.  The agencies disclosed the employees’ names and 
work stations to the unions but refused to release their home addresses. The agencies 
argued that disclosure of the home addresses was prohibited by the Privacy Act and 
that FOIA did not require their release.   The United States Supreme Court agreed 
with the agencies. 
Attorney1:  Pertinent to our discussion, in that case the Supreme Court focused 
on the applicability of one of FOIA’s privacy exemptions.  “[R]esolution of the case 
depend[ed] on a discrete inquiry: whether disclosure of the home addresses ‘would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of [the] personal privacy’ of bargaining 
unit employees within the meaning of FOIA.”200      
Judge Coffin:  How did the Supreme Court go about balancing the transparency 
and privacy interests in that case?    
Professor:  In weighing the public interest, the Court considered “the extent to 
which disclosure of the information sought would ‘she[d] light on an agency’s 
performance of its statutory duties’ or otherwise let citizens know ‘what their 
government is up to.’”201  It found that “the relevant public interest supporting 
disclosure in this case is negligible, at best,” stating that disclosure of the addresses 
“would not appreciably further ‘the citizens' right to be informed about what their 
government is up to.’ . . . Indeed, such disclosure would reveal little or nothing about 
the employing agencies or their activities.”202 
 Attorney1:  In weighing the employees’ privacy interest, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that home addresses often are publicly available through sources such 
as telephone directories and voter registration lists.  It found, however, that “[a]n 
individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding 
personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available 
to the public in some form.”203   
Professor:  The Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case is instructive.  It 
considered the fact that “[m]any people simply do not want to be disturbed at home 
by work-related matters,”  finding that “[w]hatever the reason that these employees 
have chosen not to become members of the union or to provide the union with their 
addresses . . . it is clear that they have some nontrivial privacy interest in 
nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union-related mail, and, perhaps, union-
related telephone calls or visits, that would follow disclosure.”204   
Attorney1:  In finding that “it is clear that the individual privacy interest that 
                                                                                                     
199  510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994).  The unions in that case filed unfair labor practice charges with the 
Federal Labor Relations Authority, arguing that federal labor law required the agencies to disclose the 
addresses.  Pursuant to the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-
7135 (2018), agencies must, “to the extent not prohibited by law,” furnish unions with data necessary 
for collective-bargaining purposes.  Id. § 7114(b)(4).   
200  Id. at 495. 
201  Id. 
202  Id. at 497 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 773 (1989) (emphasis added)). 
203  Id. at 500. 
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would be protected by nondisclosure is far from insignificant,”205 the Supreme Court 
also took into consideration the fact that “other parties, such as commercial 
advertisers and solicitors, must have the same access under FOIA as the unions to 
the employee address lists sought in this case.”206  
Professor:  Similarly, as stated by the United States Supreme Court a few years 
earlier in United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press,207 whether a private document falls within a FOIA privacy exemption “must 
turn on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to the basic purpose 
of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open agency action to the light of public 
scrutiny,’ rather than on the particular purpose for which the document is being 
requested.”208 
 Judge Coffin:  These cases show that it is possible to put reasonable limits on 
the transparency principle when it comes to personal information, ones that most 
people would agree are sensible. 
Professor:  In Maine, there is no state law counterpart to the Privacy Act, 
although there is the Maine Freedom of Access Act (“FOAA”).209 There are over 
300 statutory exceptions to the FOAA’s definition of a public record.  While there is 
some court precedent interpreting the exceptions, it is unclear whether the privacy 
exceptions under the FOAA are as broad in scope as those under FOIA.   
Judge Coffin:  This might be a worthwhile legal research project for a law clerk 
or law student. 
Professor:  While I agree it would useful to look at the privacy exceptions under 
the FOAA, I think there are limits to the lessons the SJC can draw from looking at 
the Privacy Act, FOIA and FOAA.    
Judge Coffin:  How so? 
Professor:  The nature of the personal information contained in the government 
agency records covered by those laws is different.  Court records, out of necessity, 
contain some of the most private, intimate details of peoples’ lives.  Civil litigation 
is essentially a forum that requires and facilitates the airing of peoples’ dirty laundry 
in public, whether litigants and non-parties like it or not.    
Attorney1:  I agree.  The information in court records exposes information 
about peoples’ troubles and vulnerabilities.  It relates to particular events in the 
person’s life.  Many are painful, shameful and embarrassing.   
Attorney2:  Each litigation is different.  Accordingly, the types of personal 
information contained in court records varies.  The information, however, always 
reveals unique details about the individual. 
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LSP1:  The circumstances surrounding its disclosure to the government also is 
different.  The personal information contained in court records is presented to the 
court as evidence by the parties and witnesses involved in a particular litigation only 
under compulsion or for the limited purpose of seeking justice.  
Professor:  In contrast to the courts, government agencies routinely collect 
certain specified categories of personal information for which there is a legitimate 
government interest.  The vast majority of such information is relatively innocuous.  
Government agencies generally do not need to pry into the private, intimate details 
of a person’s life.  Importantly, the information collected by government agencies is 
the same information for all individuals, and it is collected from all similarly situated 
citizens alike.  I think everyone would agree that there is a qualitative difference 
between the information contained in real estate tax assessment records kept by the 
local municipality and the personal information contained in court records. 
Judge Coffin:  Interesting point. 
D. “Public” Information 
Professor:  Although widely used, the term “public” has no set definition in law 
or policy.210  It is a loose concept with no distinct meaning.  It can mean different 
things depending on the context.   
Attorney1:  I agree.  For example, when I am walking down a public street, or 
driving along public highways, I do not expect that my location and movements are 
public information which can be broadcast for everyone or anyone to know.  When 
I am dining with a friend or my spouse in a public restaurant, I reasonably expect 
that the contents of our private conversation will not be instantly and broadly 
disseminated for all to know.    
Attorney2:  We also know that privacy can exist in information contained in 
records that are public. 
Professor:  In the context of the internet and digital court records, what do the 
concepts of a public record and public access mean?  
Judge Coffin:  Your question is right on the mark.  I think we all understand 
that labeling a record as “public” information is an act that is both value-laden and 
powerful.211  It carries with it significant ramifications both for individuals and 
society.   
Professor:  It is critical that such designation reflect the values the SJC intends 
to preserve, fosters the relationships and outcomes it wants, and prevents the 
problems it wants to avoid.  Among those problems are the privacy harms resulting 
from misuse of personal information that has been made “public.”  
Judge Coffin:  In many cases, saying information is public means it is free for 
others to observe, collect, use and share, essentially functioning as a permission slip 
providing cover for a wide variety of data practices, some of which are unscrupulous 
and dangerous.  Saying it is private, on the other hand, signals that there might be 
some rules people need to follow. 
Professor:  Further compounding the difficulties in determining whether to 
designate a record as public, and increasing the stakes to make sure the SJC gets it 
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right, is the fact that many of the privacy laws in existence today in the U.S, even the 
recently enacted California Consumer Privacy Act,212 which by most accounts is one 
of the strongest consumer privacy-protective regimes in the country, expressly 
exclude from their protection personal information that is publicly available from 
federal, state or local government records. 213    
Judge Coffin: Do parties and witnesses involved in a litigation understand the 
privacy implications of their disclosing to the court sensitive personal information, 
whether their own or that of others?  That is, do they understand that such disclosure 
is going to act as a waiver of their right and the right of others to protect that 
information?  
Attorney1:  I suspect many parties do not.  Sophisticated parties and parties 
represented by competent counsel probably understand.  They typically will make a 
motion to seal records. 
Attorney2: The mechanisms to protect personal information (e.g., sealing and 
impounding) are buried in the rules of court procedure.  Most pro se litigants cannot 
be expected to even be aware of them.   
Attorney1:  To my knowledge, the SJC does not publish a privacy notice of any 
kind, nor does it provide any specific education or awareness to the public about the 
ways in which they can try to protect personal information contained in court records. 
Professor: That is surprising.  In nearly every other human encounter involving 
the waiver of individual rights, fairness typically requires that, at the bare minimum, 
individuals be properly informed of the legal consequences of their actions.  In many 
areas, including health care and human subject research, the informed consent of the 
individual also is necessary.214 
Judge Coffin:  Putting aside the fact that most parties and witnesses involved 
in a litigation have no real choice in the matter, should the SJC provide more notice 
or create a mechanism to ensure that citizens are properly and adequately informed 
in advance that they may lose control over the dissemination of their most sensitive 
personal information upon entering the courthouse?   
Professor:  Yes.  More transparency about the SJC’s privacy practices is 
appropriate and necessary.  Notice is a fundamental privacy principle that has been 
universally adopted.  It is one of the key elements of the fair information privacy 
practices, often referred to in shorthand as the “FIPs.”215   
Attorney1:  My understanding is that organizations that collect personal 
information are generally required to provide notice regarding their privacy practices 
under most, if not all, legal regimes in the United States.  The specific requirements 
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regarding the form and content of the notice, as well as the manner in which it must 
be provided, are usually prescribed by statute or regulation.   
Phipps:  I will check with the SJC to find out what information it plans to 
provide to the public pertaining to its policies and practices regarding the 
safeguarding of personal information in court records.    
E. Access to Court Records; Practical Obscurity 
Phipps:  The Chief Justice has recognized that “most court records have 
historically been publicly available, and must remain accessible.”216  But she also 
has said that “we  must be  careful  not  to  confuse  the public’s right to  know  what 
its government  is  doing with an  unlimited  right  to obtain  private information 
about individuals,  simply  because  those  individuals must  interact  with  the 
government.”217    
LSP2:  Is there a way to make things public, but less accessible? 
Judge Rich:  That is an astute question.  In fact, there is precedent and a 
longstanding tradition supporting that very notion.  A concept called “practical 
obscurity” has historically worked to effectively limit accessibility and 
dissemination of court records, and people’s awareness of that limitation may have 
affected the willingness of individuals to share sensitive, personal information with 
the courts. 
Professor:  The concept of “practical obscurity,” which typically focuses on 
real-world, practical impediments to data retrieval, was first articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press.218 
Attorney1:  How is that case relevant to our present discussion?   
Professor:  The Supreme Court in that case rejected the reporters’ claim that the 
events summarized in the rap sheet were not private because they had previously 
been publicly disclosed.  The case is relevant to our discussion for several reasons.  
In determining “the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common 
law,” the Supreme Court found that it “rested in part on the degree of dissemination 
of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it 
private.” 219 
Attorney2:  Those two factors underlying privacy protection–the “degree of 
dissemination” of the personal information and the extent to which it becomes 
obsolete with the passage of time – directly come into play if the SJC makes court 
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records available on the internet.  The internet never forgets, and there are no 
boundaries for dissemination of the information.  Widespread dissemination is a 
given. 
Professor:  The Supreme Court in the Reporters case also recognized that “there 
is a vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent 
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the 
country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of 
information.”220 
Judge Coffin:  Is the “practical obscurity” that exists in personal information 
contained in paper court records at the courthouse something that the SJC should try 
to preserve in the digital world?    
Professor:  Absolutely.  Designating a court record as public information does 
not necessarily mean that the information must be made freely available and easily 
accessible to anyone and everyone on the planet, 24/7, immediately upon filing and 
forever thereafter, without restrictions or limitations of any kind, and with 
permission for the recipients to use with complete impunity.  
Judge Coffin:  The notion that information is either private or public (that is, 
one or the other and never both) seems ill conceived.  So is the notion that 
information once made public, always should be treated as public regardless of the 
passage of time.  Both notions are at odds with common sense and our real-world 
experience.  
Judge Rich:  There are plenty of examples in the law and in our daily lives that 
show the fallacy of both notions.   What is more, there is widespread court precedent 
which embraces the concept of practical obscurity.221   
Professor:  I agree.  Treating information in this “either or” manner creates a 
false dichotomy.  Privacy, we are learning, is a much more nuanced concept. 
Judge Coffin:  So, by that logic, is it correct to say that matters do not cease to 
be “private” just because they may appear in a public record?  
Professor:  Yes.  The fact that a person reveals himself to a restricted public 
does not mean that he has lost all protections before the larger public.  “Public” in 
one context does not mean “public” in all contexts.  To hold otherwise would prove 
too much.   
Judge Coffin:  What you are saying is that we can decide that certain personal 
information should be made public for purposes compatible with achieving 
transparency in court operations, but that does not mean that the privacy interest of 
the affected individual ends there or that the personal information is forever after 
intended to be made public for all purposes.   
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Professor:  Correct.  My point is that when personal information in a court 
record is made easily available on the internet for any curious individual around the 
world to see and to use for any purpose, including mischief, with no accountability, 
it seems to become disconnected from the goals of transparency.   
Attorney1:  It is entirely plausible that allowing such open access to parties’ 
personal information on the internet will erode the public’s trust and confidence in 
the MJB.  
Professor:  Making all of that personal information available on the internet 
represents a seismic change in the operations of the court.  It will be a jolt to peoples’ 
sensibilities and expectations.     
Judge Rich:  The concepts of individual trust and public confidence in the 
judiciary are key factors that should go into the calculus for determining whether 
information in court records is designated as public.   
Professor:  I agree.  These concepts play an important role in shaping people’s 
behaviors and perceptions of risk regarding their interaction with the courts and more 
specifically their expectations of privacy with respect to the personal information 
they share with the court system.  People feel relatively safe when their acts and data 
exist in zones of obscurity and are disclosed within relationships of trust.  
Phipps:  Maine’s Judicial Branch recognizes that “[t]he only real source of its 
power is the respect of the people.”222  Engendering public trust and confidence 
through impartial decision-making and accountability is a strategic priority for the 
SJC.223     
Judge Coffin:  It may seem paradoxical, but for an individual to share sensitive 
personal information, he or she needs privacy.  To be effective adjudicators in civil 
matters, especially in matters involving the family, children, and victims of domestic 
abuse and sexual assault, a court system depends on individuals feeling safe and 
comfortable with sharing sensitive personal information. 
Professor:  Every day in ordinary life people trust others to be discrete, loyal, 
and protective with personal information that is shared.  People naturally adjust their 
risk calculus based on this trust and the likelihood that the information will not travel 
too far or be used against them.  
Judge Coffin:  Maintaining this kind of individual trust in the court system is 
critically important.  Disclosures of personal information in dealing with government 
institutions, including the courts, generally carry with them expectations of 
discretion and protection, both of which are hallmarks of trust. 
Professor:  In its transition to the digital world, the SJC needs to find a way to 
maintain the same level of privacy protection that exists today in the paper world.  It 
should not implement rules that create less privacy for individuals. 
Attorney1:  If the concept of “practical obscurity” is worth preserving, how can 
we incorporate that concept into the rules regarding public access to electronic court 
records? 
Judge Coffin:  Do we know if there are controls on the digital court records 
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system that can help people feel safe?  Can sensitive information be obscured?  
Professor:   Figuring out what makes information obscure is a complex 
undertaking.  It requires consideration of many different factors, including 
searchability, permanence, comprehensibility, identifiability, and the resources, 
motivation, and pre-existing knowledge of those who seek to surveil or make use of 
the personal data.   
Phipps:  I am not certain what privacy protection features are included as part 
of the technology platform being deployed.  Some automated redaction capability is 
available, but we have not yet seen how well that will work in practice.  My 
understanding is that the results of an auto-redaction Proof of Concept in 2017 were 
promising in demonstrating the accuracy of auto-redaction, at least with respect to 
specific structured and unstructured data.224  I will check on what we know about the 
privacy protection features and get back to you with more information.       
 
F. Assembling Factual Account 
Judge Coffin:  What do we know about the technology underlying the SJC’s 
new electronic system?  
Attorney1:  Unfortunately, we know very little at this time. 
Professor:  Yet we do know that technology is not value-neutral. The SJC’s 
new electronic system has embedded within it its own calculus for regulating privacy 
and transparency interests. 
Judge Coffin:  What do you mean? 
Professor:  In developing the new electronic system, the technology vendor’s 
system architects and coders made certain assumptions and decisions about where to 
draw the line between privacy and public access to digital court records. 
Judge Coffin:  If I am following you, then, it is important to carefully examine 
how the technology works from a user perspective, as well as to understand the 
underlying assumptions and engineering decisions that went into the design and 
coding of the technology with respect to the issue of public access to digital court 
records.   
Professor:  Yes.  Conducting such examination will help us to evaluate how the 
SJC’s deployment of the new technology may affect societal norms and values 
regarding privacy and transparency.   
Attorney2:  By the same token, the SJC also should look to future developments 
in the technology as part of its solution for mitigating privacy risks while at the same 
time making the operations of the judicial branch more transparent.   
Professor:  Excellent point.   
Attorney2:  An example might help to explain.  As it happens, a former 
colleague recently was telling me about the powerful regulatory forces at play in the 
web browser industry. In establishing the rules determining whether a website is 
displayed on a particular user device, developers of web browsers apparently are in 
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the position of regulating the conduct of website owners.  They effectively are a 
chokepoint for website owners.  Some browsers, especially some of the more popular 
ones such as Firefox, are designed with more privacy protections than the others.  If 
owners want to make sure that their websites are displayed on user devices with 
Firefox installed on them, they must adhere to the rules set by the developers of that 
browser. 
Judge Coffin:  I see.  As purchasers of the technology, state court systems can 
and should think about using their collective influence to direct the technology 
vendor’s development of the technology so it is capable of being configured in a way 
that aligns more closely to societal norms and expectations. 
Professor:  Yes.  That is exactly right. 
Judge Coffin:  What do we know about the possible dangers, harms, injustices 
and indignities to individuals that could result from the SJC’s decision to make 
personal information in court records available to the public on the internet?   
LSP4:  Unfortunately, we know little about the potential social justice and 
access to justice impacts at this time. 
Professor:  Coincidently, a few weeks ago a colleague forwarded to me a copy 
of a recent article that caught my attention.  The article, authored by Lizzie O’Shea, 
was published in The New Republic with the provocative title “Digital Privacy is a 
Class Issue.”225  In the article, the headline for which is “[a]s corporations mine data 
and monetize the web, the divide between rich and poor on the Internet grows wider,” 
Ms. O’Shea finds that “the digital age has given rise to industrialized data mining, 
content curation, and automated decision-making, all of which undermine 
democracy and intensify social divisions” and “calls for a more sophisticated 
understanding of privacy – one that can appreciate both the collective and individual 
nature of this right.”226  She argues for “[a] positive vision of privacy [which] treats 
it as a communal right – one that the poor, rather than the rich, have the greatest stake 
in exercising.”227  
LSP1:  Ms. O’Shea’s vision of privacy is interesting.   I tend to agree that 
impoverished people and other disadvantaged segments of the population generally 
have a greater stake in exercising the right of privacy given their life circumstances. 
Judge Coffin:  It is an intriguing proposition, but it is not clear to me why.   
Professor:  Many poor and disadvantaged people do not have access to legal 
counsel, so they are unaware of their rights and unable to take appropriate measures 
to protect themselves.  Given their life circumstances, they also are easy prey for bad 
actors and thus are more likely to be exploited.  As a general matter, I think the most 
vulnerable people in our population are likely to be affected disproportionately by 
the SJC’s decision to make court records available to the public on the internet. 
Judge Coffin:  I have no difficulty recognizing that new, potential threats to 
personal liberty and equality could arise out of the SJC’s decision.   
Professor:  It has been said that “[f]ew would claim that online access to court 
records would have no impact on information flows – indeed, it is precisely the 
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prospect of such changes that accounts for much of the enthusiastic support for online 
access.” 228  
Judge Coffin:  I think most people would agree that the information flows 
associated with the internet and access to online databases are quite different.  It is 
important that we illuminate those differences.   
Professor:  I agree.  As the SJC enters the digital age, it needs to understand 
those differences in information flows, as well as their implications, if it desires to 
maintain (and not change) existing normative commitments to transparency and 
privacy.   
LSP1:  In addition to unfettered accessibility, broad and widespread 
dissemination, and no user accountability, there is a complete loss of control with 
digital records made available on the internet. 
LSP2:  The information in the records also effectively becomes permanent.  The 
internet never forgets. 
Professor:  As a society, we also do not yet fully comprehend the perils of the 
internet and the implications of these new information flows.229 
Attorney1:  The Maine state court system handles many different types of 
matters and special dockets that involve the collection of very intimate and sensitive 
personal information of individuals, some of whom are extremely vulnerable.  
Individuals generally are not in a position to refuse to provide this information to the 
court, so choice is not always an option for individuals.   
Judge Coffin:  Is the SJC planning to take any special measures to protect them 
in the electronic system and digital court records environment?   
Phipps:  One of the initiatives identified in the MJB’s 2019-2020 language 
access plan230 is tracking interpreter usage by event, case type, and other parameters.  
While it is not clear what functionality will be included in the new electronic system, 
the MJB plans to work with the technology provider to address the MJB’s 
requirements for managing, monitoring, and improving services related to 
interpreters. 
Judge Coffin:  I suppose that also unknown (and unknowable) at this time is 
how the new electronic system will work in actual practice once it is up and running.  
Phipps:  We plan to implement the new system in phases by region across the 
state beginning sometime in late 2020.  After we go live, the MJB will be monitoring 
how the new system works in actual practice.  It recognizes that it may need to make 
adjustments to the system, and perhaps even the court rules, based on actual user 
experience.   
LSP4:  Does the SJC plan to digitize and migrate to the new electronic system 
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paper-based court records that had been filed prior to the new system’s go-live date? 
Phipps:  I do not know.  There has been no announcement from the SJC 
regarding the cut-off date after which paper records will be made available online. 
Judge Coffin:  Hmmm.  Unless the SJC has obtained the consent of all parties 
in those prior and pending litigations, it would seem to violate basic notions of 
fairness if the SJC decided to proceed with such a plan.   
Professor:  Giving retroactive effect to changes in privacy practices without 
consumer notice and consent has been declared an unfair and deceptive trade practice 
by the United States Federal Trade Commission.231  
Judge Coffin:  Are there any detailed studies examining the potential privacy 
harms to individuals resulting from public remote online access to digital court 
records?   
LSP1: I am not aware of any such studies.  
Judge Coffin:  How about studies examining the remedies that have been made 
available for individuals to seek relief or redress for actual or potential privacy harms 
resulting from public disclosure or misuse of personal data from digital court 
records?  
LSP2:  I have not seen any such studies.  In addition, it would be helpful if we 
had more information about the nature and number of cybersecurity incidents in state 
court systems, the level of effectiveness of state courts’ incident response plans, and 
the privacy protection mechanisms and features that have been put in place in other 
states to mitigate the risk of security incidents and misuse of personal data and their 
effectiveness.  
LSP3:  I also think it would be helpful to know more about how other states are 
managing filings by unrepresented litigants, the resources that are available to assist 
unrepresented litigants, and the ways in which other states are educating the public 
about protection of personal information.  For example, it would be helpful to know 
how other states are handling situations in which litigants and other individuals do 
not have the financial means to make payment of court fees or are otherwise unable 
to make payment electronically. 
LSP4:  I would like to know about the ways in which other states are facilitating 
protection of non-party personal information.   
Phipps:  The National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) has an extensive list 
of publications on its website, including publications related to Records/Document 
Management, Privacy/Public Access to Court Records, and a 2019 Survey of E-filing 
efforts in the United States.232 However, I’m not aware of any studies that have been 
                                                                                                     
231  Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 43, 446 (2004) (consent order); Facebook, Inc., 2012 WL 
3518628 (F.T.C.), at *6 (July 27, 2012) (“[B]y designating certain user profile information publicly 
available that previously had been subject to privacy settings, Facebook materially changed its promises 
that users could keep such information private.  Facebook retroactively applied these changes to 
personal information that it had previously collected from users, without their informed consent.”); 
Letter from FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection to Junkbusters Corp. and Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (May 24, 2001) (in the event of “material change” to stated privacy policy, Amazon 
would be required not only to provide “adequate notice” of the change, but to obtain “consumers’ 
consent to the change with respect to information already collected from them”). 
232  See, e.g., Records/Document Management Resource Guide, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 
(last updated Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Technology/Records-Document-
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conducted by the NCSC which examine any of these issues.  
Professor:  To my knowledge, no comprehensive studies have been conducted 
by the NCSC or any other organization examining the social justice and access to 
justice impact of implementing digital court records systems in other states. 
Judge Coffin:  If such studies exist, they could be useful in informing the SJC 
as to how to calibrate the balance between privacy and transparency.  If such studies 
do not exist, then I would urge NCSC or some other organization to take the initiative 
and find a way to commission one or more such studies. 
LSP1:  Should JAG consider commissioning a study?  It might examine whether 
permitting public remote online access to court records disproportionately harms the 
marginalized and most vulnerable persons in our society, including the 
unrepresented, minorities, the poor, children, and victims of domestic abuse, sexual 
assault and other crimes.   
Professor:  One scholarly study conducted in 2015 analyzed the amount and 
types of sensitive personal information contained in certain court records in cases 
heard by the North Carolina Supreme Court. 233  Although not broad based, the study 
could provide a useful frame of reference for the SJC. 
 Phipps:  Thanks for the citation to the North Carolina study.  We will have to 
take a look at its findings. 
Professor:  Although there are no comprehensive studies examining the 
different issues that have been raised, there are a few things that we have learned 
from the experience of other states that have made the digital transition.  For 
example, it is known that there often are unintended consequences from making court 
records available online and easily searchable to anyone with internet access. 
LSP2:  The experience of Massachusetts is a good example.  It involved the 
release by the Massachusetts Trial Court in 2013 of its electronic case access system, 
MassCourts, which made court eviction records available online.   In a June 2019 
report entitled Evicted for Life - How Eviction Court Records are Creating a New 
Barrier to Housing, the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute found that “[l]andlords, 
property owners, and tenant screening companies are now using this free and easy 
access to conduct tenant screening, often with unfair and dire consequences for 
tenants.” 234 
The report explains:  
why eviction court records – and MassCourts records in particular – are unreliable 
                                                                                                     
Management/Resource-Guide.aspx [https://perma.cc/ARG7-AYQR]; Privacy/Public Access to Court 
Records State Links, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Privacy-Public-Access-to-Court-Records/State-
Links.aspx [https://perma.cc/CS8N-PLZE] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). The most recent NCSC 
publication related to court records access was published in the summer of 2017.  See Thomas M. 
Clarke & Janet Lewis DiGraski, Best Practices for Court Privacy Policy Formation, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS (July 2017),  https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/tech/id/876/ 
[https://perma.cc/M73W-TURL]. 
233  David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical Study, 30 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 1807 (2016).  
234  MASSACHUSETTS LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, EVICTED FOR LIFE: HOW EVICTION COURT RECORDS 
ARE CREATING A NEW BARRIER TO HOUSING 1 (2019), 
http://www.passthehomesact.org/uploads/2/7/0/4/27042339/evicted_for_life_mlri.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/68QC-2UK9]. 
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indicators of whether someone may be a good tenant . . . . [It] also provides evidence 
about how tenants are being harmed by their eviction records.   No matter whether 
a tenancy lasted decades, ended amicably with a court agreement, or whether a court 
ruled in favor of the tenant, the moment a case is filed the tenant has a permanent 
eviction record that will follow them for life.235  
Judge Coffin:  The findings in that report are troubling.  
Professor:  The SJC should also factor into its decision-making what is known 
about data brokers.  They represent a multi-billion dollar industry that is largely 
unregulated and often hidden from public view.  Based on reports I have seen, data 
brokers have amassed vast amounts of detailed personal data about individuals, 
which they then analyze and sell to third parties, which exposes citizens to targeting 
by unscrupulous marketers and worse (e.g., stalkers, harassers, and perpetrators of 
fraud).  
Judge Coffin:  How do data brokers figure into this discussion? 
Professor:  One of the sources of personal data for data brokers is public record 
information, including information in court records.   
Judge Coffin:  So, data brokers mine and resell the personal data that is made 
publicly available on the internet?   And there is a growing market for that personal 
data? 
Professor:  Yes.  According to a 2017 report issued by the Vermont Office of 
the Attorney General, 236  the data broker industry has grown significantly in past 
decades due to advances in technology, including the internet and smart phones, 
increases in processing power, and decreases in data storage costs.  
As explained in the report, 
Data Brokers often combine data from several sources, allowing them to create 
extensive dossiers of information on individuals, sometimes including thousands of 
data points on a single person. Some Data Brokers focus primarily on collecting raw 
data from multiple sources, combining it, and “cleaning up” the data (i.e. confirming 
its accuracy). These data sets are then sold for use to various businesses.  
Some Data Brokers also offer predictive analytics. Essentially, the Data Brokers 
apply algorithms to individuals’ data based on correlations in data, and attempt to 
draw conclusions about consumers from their data. For example, based on the 
person’s purchase history, online searches, social media “likes,” and/or other inputs, 
a Data Broker might be able to extrapolate information about the individual’s level 
of interest in a service or product, the individual’s likelihood to purchase, physical 
or mental health, financial status, gullibility, tolerance for risk, addictions, or other 
likely attributes. The Data Broker can then add these conclusions to the data set and 
sell them as well. Consumer advocates have taken issue with the accuracy of these 
conclusions.237 
LSP3:  What types of personal data are available for sale from data brokers? 
Professor:  The Vermont report includes a reference to the testimony of Pam 
                                                                                                     
235  Id.   
236  See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, REPORT TO 
THE VERMONT GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE DATA BROKER WORKING GROUP (December 15, 2017), 
https://ago.vermont.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2017-12-15-Data-Broker-Working-Group-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/72T9-K2NX] [hereinafter VERMONT REPORT]. 
237  Id. at 4. 
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Dixon, Executive Director, World Privacy Forum, before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on December 18, 2013.238  In her testimony, 
in which she shared her research findings, she reported that the following types of 
lists are available for sale and have been sold by data brokers:  
 Rape survivors 
 Addresses of domestic violence shelters (which keep their locations secret 
under law) 
 Police officers’ and state troopers’ home addresses 
 Genetic disease sufferers 
 Senior citizens suffering from dementia 
 HIV/AIDS sufferers 
 People with addictive behaviors and alcohol, gambling and drug 
addictions 
 People with diseases and prescriptions taken (including cancer and mental 
illness) 
 Consumers who might want payday loans, including targeted minority 
groups 
 People with low consumer credit scores.239 
Judge Coffin:  I can see why you think this development in society is material 
and should be considered as part of the calculus for the SJC’s decision-making.  It is 
significant. 
Professor:  A separate but related development involving information 
technology and data analytics is equally concerning.  We are living in an age in which 
data scientists, who have access to and can analyze huge amounts of structured and 
unstructured personal data, some of which is derived from public government 
records, are being employed to develop proprietary algorithms that are used to 
predict and manipulate consumer behavior.  Among other things, the algorithms are 
being used to make decisions about an individual’s eligibility for credit, 
employment, and housing.  There is an increasing awareness of Big Data’s predictive 
privacy harms, which include enabling discriminatory housing and employment 
practices and exposing sensitive health information.240   
Judge Coffin:  Very interesting.  I would like to learn more about Big Data and 
these new types of predictive privacy harms.   
Professor:  There is a lot more for all of us to learn about Big Data, which, as 
an industry, is completely unregulated.  Big Data and these new predictive type 
harms represent yet another threat to personal liberty and equality that can result 
from the widespread dissemination of personal information.  
F. Incrementalism and Workability 
Judge Coffin:  In fashioning court rules in this area, what level of generality 
                                                                                                     
238  See id. at 8; Pam Dixon, What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do 
They Use It?, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Dec.18, 2013), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/WPF_PamDixon_CongressionalTestimony_DataBrokers_2013_fs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YJ6Y-L3TZ ] [hereinafter Testimony of Pam Dixon]. 
239  Vermont Report, supra note 236, at 8; Testimony of Pam Dixon, supra note 238.  
240  See generally Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B. C. L. REV. 93 (2013).  
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should there be?  Should the SJC provide an all-encompassing set of rules?  Is there 
a way for the SJC to narrow its decision by establishing narrow criteria? 
Phipps:  The SJC is considering adopting broad, prescriptive rules about 
whether to seal or unseal records in whole categories of cases, decisions that in the 
past would have been resolved by trial judges on a case by case basis. 
Judge Coffin:  Are there advantages to such rules over the reliance on judges 
to seal court records only when a party has shown a “compelling need” for secrecy 
sufficient to overcome the public’s interest in access?   
Phipps:  In the new digital world, the SJC is considering abandoning historical 
practices because of the potential for nearly unlimited distribution of digital 
information and the concomitant increase in motions for protection.  The SJC expects 
that once parties and their lawyers learn about the broad dissemination, many more 
individuals would seek orders of protection, potentially overwhelming an 
understaffed Judicial Branch.241    
Professor: Generally, courts have disfavored blanket rules that failed to account 
for individual circumstances.  The Supreme Court emphasized this point when it 
overturned, on constitutional grounds, a Massachusetts law which automatically 
required the closing of a trial when a victim under the age of eighteen testified 
concerning certain specified sexual offenses. In Globe Newspaper Company v. 
Superior Court,242 the Court recognized that protecting a minor's well-being was a 
compelling interest, but found that this interest “does not justify a mandatory closure 
rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the 
significance of the interest.”243   
LSP1:  Except in rare circumstances enunciated in rule or statutes, state court 
judges are vested with the authority to release or protect court information in paper 
records.  Parties and other interested individuals have the ability to argue for or 
against redaction, sealing, and protection of information.      
Judge Coffin:  Is there a technological solution that could assist in providing 
the right balance of privacy and transparency of court records?   
Phipps:  The system incorporates redaction functionality, although I am not sure 
exactly how it works.    
Professor:  We have learned that technological redaction has significant 
limitations and is not an effective solution to protect the privacy of individuals.  As 
long ago as 2010, Paul Ohm, a leading privacy scholar, brought attention to the fact 
that computer scientists “have demonstrated that they can often ‘reidentify’ or 
                                                                                                     
241  See, e.g., Hon. Leigh I. Saufley, Chief Justice, Maine Supreme Judicial Court, The State of the 
Judiciary: A Report to the Joint Convention of the First Reg. Session of the 128th Maine Legislature: 
Managing in a Time of Change (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/supreme/speeches/2017_soj.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA8F-
X23X]; see also, e.g., Barry C. Lucier, A Comparative Analysis of Funding for Judicial Services in 
Maine: Levels and Trends, 1996 – 2010, MUSKIE SCHOOL CAPSTONES (2013),  
https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/muskie_capstones/4 [https://perma.cc/2ZRZ-FSKG]; Hon. Leigh 
I. Saufley, Funding Justice: The Budget of the Maine Judicial Branch-We Did Get There from Here, 62 
ME. L. REV. 671 (2010).  
242  457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
243  Id. at 598, 602. 
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‘deanonymize’ individuals hidden in anonymized data with astonishing ease.”244  In 
his ground-breaking article examining this research, Ohm described in detail three 
spectacular failures of anonymization to reinforce his point that “we have made a 
mistake, labored beneath a fundamental misunderstanding, which has assured us 
much less privacy than we have assumed.”245  Each of these incidents – the 2006 
AOL data release,246 the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission’s release of 
“de-identified” medical records,247 and the 2006 Netflix prize data study248 – has 
been widely publicized.  
Attorney1:  I recall Judge Posner came to the same realization regarding the 
limitations of redaction in Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft.249  In that 
case, quashing a government subpoena for redacted medical records relating to late-
term abortions performed at a hospital, Judge Posner observed:  
Some of these women will be afraid that when their redacted records are made a part 
of the trial record in New York, persons of their acquaintance, or skillful 
“Googlers,” sifting the information contained in the medical records concerning 
each patient’s medical and sex history, will put two and two together, “out” the 45 
women, and thereby expose them to threats, humiliation, and obloquy.  As the court 
pointed out in Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital . . . “whether the patients’ 
identities would remain confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying 
numbers is questionable at best. The patients’ admit and discharge summaries 
arguably contain histories of the patients’ prior and present medical conditions, 
information that in the cumulative can make the possibility of recognition very 
high.”250 
Professor:  Invasion of privacy is not the price citizens should have to pay to 
litigate private matters in court.  
Judge Coffin:  Additionally, application of the rules regarding digital court 
records access should not interfere with the proper functioning of the court system.  
Put differently, the rules will need to be workable as a practical matter for the court 
system, filers, and the public.     
Phipps:  With respect to these last two points made by Judge Coffin and the 
Professor, I think the SJC would agree completely.   
Judge Rich:  Well, on that positive note, I think we should end for tonight.  We 
have covered a lot of ground in this initial conversation.  The discussion has given 
us a lot to think about.  I move that we adjourn this meeting, reflect on what we have 
heard, and reconvene in a few weeks.   
Judge Coffin:  I wholeheartedly agree.  These are complex issues that require 
more thought and conversation.  I look forward to meeting again and continuing the 
conversation.  Good night.   
                                                                                                     
244  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701, 1701 (2010). 
245  Id. 
246  Id. at 1717. 
247  Id. at 1719. 
248  Id. at 1720. 
249  Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004).   
250  Id. (quoting Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 435 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ill. 1982)). 
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G. Epilogue 
Following the meeting, having heard Judge Coffin’s call to action, the 
Professor, Legal Service Providers, Bar Fellows and Attorneys all decided to 
coordinate their efforts and work together to continue to engage in the conversation 
with the SJC regarding the subject of digital court records access.  Amazingly, all of 
the students in the back of the room who had been listening intently to the 
conversation signed up to take the Professor’s information privacy law course the 
following semester. 
Looking back, Judge Rich was pleased to have had Judge Coffin participate in 
a discussion with the group he helped create.  He could see the great wisdom in 
having the SJC adopt Judge Coffin’s approach to rights-sensitive judicial balancing 
to improve the quality of its decision-making regarding the subject of digital court 
records access.  
At home, as he prepared to make some notes in his journal, Judge Coffin likewise 
felt pleased to get back into the action.  It gave him an opportunity to test an idea he 
had always wondered about – namely, whether his rights-sensitive judicial 
balancing approach still had relevance in the digital era and whether it could 
improve judicial decision-making in a different context, namely the adoption of court 
rules.  
A glint of satisfaction came across his face.  Not only was the test successful, 
but the conversation gave him the opportunity to advocate once again for social 
justice and access to justice issues that he had championed during his lifetime.  He 
could see that the conversation stirred great interest among people who participated.  
Indeed, perhaps a few would heed his call to action.  At that moment, he was 
reminded of his own words, in which he had confided: “I had really developed a 
sideline to judging, which was secular preaching.  I called on readers and listeners 
to act.  I was still, as always, an advocate.”251    
CONCLUSION 
I hope that I have succeeded in demonstrating in this essay that Judge Coffin 
would have much to contribute, both in terms of the process itself and the substantive 
issues, regarding the subject of digital court records access.  Hearing the questions 
that he might ask and listening to the observations and thoughts that he might share 
alone would prove instructive.   
On a personal note, by bringing Judge Coffin into this particular conversation, 
my hope is to help ensure that his judicial legacy lives on.  Sadly, I suspect there are 
many lawyers and judges who have little or no understanding of Judge Coffin’s 
approach to rights-sensitive judicial balancing and how it might improve the quality 
of judicial decision-making, even in today’s internet age.  That is unfortunate.  Those 
of us who continue to embrace Judge Coffin’s approach when faced with deciding 
(or arguing) the “hard cases,” whatever the issue, will not be surprised to learn that 
his approach is equally effective in a multitude of contexts, regardless of the time 
period. 
With its transition from paper to electronic records, the state court system in 
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Maine is entering new, uncharted territory.  As acknowledged by Chief Justice 
Saufley, it is a major, complex undertaking.  It is critical that the SJC get it right in 
orchestrating the conversion to electronic records because the stakes are exceedingly 
high for individuals, society, and the judicial branch as an institution.   
I believe that everyone today would agree that the digital and paper worlds are 
different.  Further, given the information flow disruptions we are witnessing every 
day involving the global spread of new information and communication 
technologies, I believe that no one would find it difficult to understand that, in the 
absence of adequate safeguards, a decision to make state court records available to 
the public on the internet will create new threats to personal liberty and equality.  
The SJC must be steadfast and vigilant in guarding against those threats as it 
comes to terms with the fact that it is operating in a different world.  It is contending 
with a whole new reality.  In addition to unfettered accessibility, broad and 
widespread dissemination, and no user accountability, there will be a complete loss 
of control with digital records made available on the internet.  The personal 
information in such records effectively will become permanent.  The internet never 
forgets. 
A consistent theme in Judge Coffin’s life’s work and writings is that law must 
continue to adapt to meet the demands of society.  Effective judicial balancing 
requires that the SJC be willing to engage in open, candid conversations with 
members of the Bar and the public and look afresh at where to draw the line between 
transparency and privacy.   
At the same time, however, it is imperative that the SJC proceed cautiously and 
with sensitivity in balancing the rights of the individual against societal interests.  It 
must hold fast to prevailing social norms when trying to fashion appropriate rules for 
access to court records in the digital environment, if it hopes to preserve the moral 
values and individual rights reflected in our democratic form of government.     
Recognizing and understanding the value of privacy in our democratic society 
is also essential.  Without privacy there can be no freedom.252  As summed-up 
elegantly by Alan F. Westin, a pioneering privacy law scholar widely credited with 
authoring the first complete and authoritative study of privacy in America: 
The basic point is that each individual must, within the larger context of his culture, 
his status and his personal situation, make a continuous adjustment between the 
needs for solitude and companionship; for intimacy and general social intercourse; 
for anonymity and responsible participation in society; for reserve and disclosure.  
A free society leaves this choice to the individual, for this is the core of the “right 
of individual privacy” – the right of the individual to decide for himself, with only 
extraordinary exceptions in the interests of society, when and on what terms his acts 
should be revealed to the general public.253  
As an advocate for justice, I am a strong proponent of transparency and privacy.  
Both interests are important in our democracy, and it is critical that we take measures 
to preserve both.  In balancing these interests, I therefore urge the SJC to embrace 
Judge Coffin’s judicial philosophy and rights-sensitive balancing framework in 
determining court rules for digital court records access.  By doing so, I believe, the 
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SJC will significantly improve the quality and effectiveness of its decision-making 
process, thus engendering increased public trust and confidence in its decision.  
